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INTRODUCTION 
Recent judicial interpretations of U.S. copyright law have prompted businesses 
to design technologies in ways that enable the making and transmission of copies of 
works to consumers while falling outside the scope of the owner’s exclusive rights.  
The archetypal example was Aereo, Inc.’s system for providing online access to 
broadcast television.  Aereo allowed users to tune into individual antennae to 
stream near-live TV to themselves, online.  If this activity fell within the scope of 
the exclusive right of public performance, then it required the permission of right 
holders.1  The “Transmit Clause” of the U.S. Copyright Act’s definition of “to 
perform publicly” brings within the scope of the public performance right: 
[T]ransmitting or otherwise communicating a performance or display of the work . . . 
to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public 
capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in 
separate places and at the same time or at different times.2 
Holdings from the Second Circuit that the relevant performance was the specific 
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 1. The process also implicated the exclusive right of reproduction, see 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) 
(2012), since copies of broadcasts are made when users instruct Aereo’s system that they wish to 
“watch” or “record” a show.  However, Aereo argued that the copies are made by consumers and 
amount to unremunerable fair uses in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1984 holding that 
consumer uses of Sony’s Betamax VCR to timeshift free broadcast television programming are lawful.  
See Brief for Respondent at 36–37, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo III), 134 S. Ct. 2498 
(2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 1245459 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417 (1984)).  Those copies were not the subject of the current litigation and so the merits of that 
argument will not be discussed further in this Article. 
 2. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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transmission from each copy, and that those performances could not be public if 
made to only a single user, gave Aereo a blueprint for avoiding liability.3  It took 
up the invitation by designing a system incorporating thousands of dime-sized 
antennas.4  By temporarily assigning one to each user, from which she could access 
only the signals she could freely pick up from her own rooftop, Aereo’s service 
enabled individual copies to be made of each program and then transmitted on 
request to the user.5  Since each transmission was directed only to the single 
requesting user, Aereo argued it could not be considered made “to the public.”6 
Broadcasters sought a preliminary injunction against Aereo on the grounds that 
its near-live transmissions were indeed infringing public performances.7  The 
broadcasters principally contended that under the statute, the relevant performance 
was not the unique transmission, but the performance of the underlying work.8  The 
Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit adopted Aereo’s 
interpretation; the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, six to three.9 
At their broadest, the implications of both parties’ contentions were equally 
unpalatable.  Aereo’s interpretation focused attention on the audience of a 
particular transmission of a performance of the work.  This approach, if given the 
imprimatur of the Supreme Court, would have encouraged others to design similar 
technologies to involve unique copies and transmissions, in order to immunize 
themselves from any finding of infringement of the public performance right.10  
Moreover, by effectively reading the coverage of asynchronous transmissions out 
of the statute, Aereo’s construction might also have placed the United States in 
violation of its international obligation to implement the exclusive right to make 
works available “in such a way that members of the public may access them from a 
place and at a time individually chosen by them.”11 
The broadcasters’ focus on the communication of the performance of the 
underlying work,12 taken to its own extreme, had the potential to impose public 
performance liability on any provider, including cloud storage providers such as 
Dropbox, whose technology happened to involve transmissions of the same work to 
multiple members of the public, and regardless of whether or not the service had 
initially proposed to transmit the work to the consumer.13 
 
 3. See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 124–25 (2d 
Cir. 2008); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 
2d 607, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also discussion infra Part I.B.1.a. 
 4. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2503. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Id. at 2508. 
 7. Id. at 2503–04. 
 8. See id. at 2504. 
 9. Id. at 2503–04. 
 10. Not all technology providers would be able to “Aereoize” themselves:  several factors would 
need to be present to make it possible to do so.  Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note *, at 20. 
 11. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 105-17 (1997), 2186 U.N.T.S. 121. 
 12. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2508. 
 13. This is an illustration of the broadest interpretation of the broadcasters’ argument.  There were 
potential ways of reading the clause more narrowly to avoid the worst of the threatened collateral 
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A majority of the Supreme Court held that Aereo’s near-live transmissions were 
indeed performances that Aereo made to the public, and Aereo has now been 
enjoined from engaging in any transmissions while broadcasts are airing.14  
However, the Court crafted those holdings narrowly in an explicit attempt to limit 
their implications for other technology providers.15  In so doing, it resolved the 
controversy over which is the statutorily relevant performance, but raised a number 
of puzzling new questions.  After setting out the factual context and outlining the 
scope of the Supreme Court’s decision, we consider the ramifications of the 
decision for other technology providers and users, and debate the merits and 
weaknesses of the decision. 
I.  THE CONTROVERSY 
A.  AEREO’S DESIGN 
Aereo launched its online television service in 2012.  Tapping into perceived 
consumer frustration with high cable prices and inflexible “bundling” models,16 it 
enabled individuals to access recorded broadcast content over the Internet from 
computers and mobile devices, in a way that obviated consumers’ need for any 
physical recording device—or even a TV set.17  Subscribers could use Aereo’s 
technology to watch broadcast television either near-live or at their later 
convenience from a variety of Internet-connected screens, including phones and 
tablets.18  By adding geographic and temporal flexibility while still preserving the 
ability to watch TV live, Aereo provided what for many users was a better-than-
perfect substitute for live TV viewership.19 
As indicated above, the technology worked by combining thousands of 
thumbnail-sized, independently-functioning antennas with cloud-based recording 
and storage functionality.20  The system was based around copies, which were 
made regardless of whether a subscriber requested to “watch” a broadcast (for near-
live viewing) or “record” it (for future consumption).  When a subscriber launched 
 
damage.  Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note *, at 25.  
 14. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo IV), Nos. 12-cv-1540 & 12-cv-1543, 2014 
WL 5393867 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014).  Aereo has since filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.  
See The Next Chapter, AEREO (Nov. 21, 2014), http://perma.cc/GUF6-YJVL.  
 15. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2510–11; see also text quoted infra note 142. 
 16. Jeff John Roberts, Aereo’s Big Bet to Break the TV Industry:  CEO Chet Kanojia Explains, 
GIGAOM (Feb. 7, 2013), http://perma.cc/E3B3-N3EC?type=source. 
 17. See Press Release, Aereo, Aereo Announces $20.5M Series A Financing Led by IAC; New 
Technology Platform Allows Consumers Access to Live TV over the Internet (Feb. 14, 2012), 
http://perma.cc/H3M4-JPYJ. 
 18. See id. 
 19. Aereo emphasized this in a press release, announcing:  “Now you have the gift of portability.  
And when it comes to sports, the only thing better than portability is LIVE access . . . and there is no 
arguing that sports are best live.”  Gaining Yards, AEREO (Feb. 24, 2012), http://perma.cc/DP5H-NVVJ. 
 20. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(finding that each antenna functioned independently).  This finding was not appealed.  See WNET, 
Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013).  
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a request for either service, by clicking on a program in the electronic programming 
guide that Aereo offered its customers, Aereo’s servers would allocate a personal 
antenna and transcoder to the requesting user.21  The servers would then instruct the 
antenna to tune in to the relevant broadcast frequency and create a new directory in 
which to store the recording.22  Since users were typically assigned a new antenna 
for each transaction, many different individuals accessed the same antenna over 
time.23  However, no two users were ever assigned the same antenna 
simultaneously, and recordings made while an antenna was assigned to a particular 
user were never available to any other subscriber.24  This system meant that if 
10,000 users all requested the same program to be recorded, 10,000 antennas would 
separately tune in to it, and unique copies would be made for each.25  If a user had 
selected “watch,” the recording would be discarded once she finished watching 
(unless she chose to keep it); “recorded” programs would not be automatically 
discarded.26  Users of either method were able to commence playback of the 
recording as it was being made, and the recording enabled them to pause and 
rewind “live” broadcasts.27 
B.  WHAT MADE THE LAW VULNERABLE TO AEREO’S CHALLENGE? 
Viewed in technical isolation, Aereo’s design looks clumsy and wasteful.  Why 
utilize thousands of antennae and copies when just one of each could achieve the 
same end?  Why make copies at all for subscribers who simply want to watch a 
program live?  Viewed through the lens of recent judicial interpretation of the U.S. 
copyright law, however, the design comes into focus as logical and even rather 
elegant.  Aereo’s service implicated two of the copyright owner’s exclusive 
rights—those concerning public performance and reproduction—but was designed 
to fall outside the scope of those rights as recently interpreted by U.S. courts.28 
 
 21. Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377. 
 22. Id. at 378. 
 23. Note, however, that users with ‘static’ subscriptions are generally assigned the same antennas 
on an ongoing basis.  See id. at 377–78. 
 24. Id. at 378. 
 25. It appears that three different copies of each program are actually made, of different quality, 
allowing a user to choose the one best suited to the Internet connection she is using.  Hearst Stations Inc. 
v. Aereo, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 2d 32, 35 (D. Mass 2013). 
 26. Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377–78. 
 27. Id. at 377. 
 28. Amended Answer and Counterclaim at 1, WNET v. Aereo, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 281 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Nos. 12-cv-1540 & 12-cv-1543), 2012 WL 3019466 (“Aereo merely provides the 
Aereo Technology that consumers may use to do what they are legally entitled to do:  (1) access free and 
legally accessible over-the-air television broadcasts using an antenna; (2) create individual, unique 
recordings of those broadcasts for personal use, see Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); and (3) record and play back those unique recordings utilizing a remotely-
located digital video recorder (“DVR”) to personal devices.  See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, 
Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).”)  This paper focuses on the ways in which Aereo was designed to 
skirt the contours of the public performance right.  For a more detailed discussion of how it also sought 
to sidestep the reproduction right, see Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note *, at 5–6.   
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1.  The Public Performance Right 
Section 106(4) of the Copyright Act grants the copyright owner in motion 
pictures and various other works the exclusive right to perform them publicly.29  
The Act defines “perform” as “to recite, render, play, dance, or act [the work], 
either directly or by means of any device or process, or, in the case of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make 
the sounds accompanying it audible.”30  Performances must be 
“contemporaneously perceptible”; this requirement distinguishes delivery of a 
download from the delivery of a stream.31  In the latter instance, the user sees 
and/or hears the work as it is being communicated to her; in the former, she will not 
experience the work’s contents unless she subsequently summons the work from 
her computer’s memory. 
The Act also defines “[t]o perform or display a work “publicly” in relevant part 
as: 
[B]y transmitting or otherwise communicating a performance or display of the work . 
. . to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the 
public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or 
in separate places and at the same time or at different times.32 
This provision, known as the Transmit Clause, generally applies to electronic 
transmissions.  The Copyright Act defines to “transmit” a performance or display 
of the work as “to communicate it by any device or process whereby images or 
sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.”33  “Devices” and 
“processes” expressly include those developed after the law came into effect.34 
a.  The Cablevision Precedent 
Aereo built its system in reliance on the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the 
Transmit Clause in Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings.  That litigation concerned 
the legality of Cablevision’s “Remote Storage DVR System” (RS-DVR), which 
worked the same way as a regular digital video recorder (DVR), except that, 
instead of the consumer recording the programming onto the hard disk of a device 
in her home, Cablevision’s service would record it onto a customer’s allotted 
storage space on one of the company’s central servers.35  Separate recordings 
 
 29. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012). 
 30. Id. § 101. 
 31. United States v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors, Publishers, 627 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir. 2010).  
The Supreme Court in Aereo confirmed the requirement that the work be contemporaneously visible or 
audible at the time of its transmission.  See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo III), 134 S. Ct. 
2498, 2508 (2014). 
 32. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Detailed descriptions of the Cablevision RS-DVR are set out in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2008), and Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
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would be made for each subscriber who requested one.36  To play the recordings, a 
customer could select the desired program using her remote control, and the 
recording stored on her portion of the central hard disk would be streamed to her 
television via her cable set-top box.37  This system closely replicated the 
functionality of a traditional DVR—but also resembled a video-on-demand 
service.38  The principal difference between the two technologies was that users 
accessing programs via the RS-DVR had to request to record them in advance of 
airtime, whereas video-on-demand content does not such requests.39 
Cablevision obtained no licenses for these activities and contended that it was 
under no obligation to do so.40  Right holders disagreed, arguing that Cablevision 
infringed their exclusive rights to perform publicly and reproduce their works.  
Notably, the parties reached a deal to leave certain issues off the table in the 
resulting litigation:  the plaintiffs did not claim secondary infringement, and in 
exchange, Cablevision waived any defenses based on its customers’ possible fair 
use.41 
There was no dispute that performances were occurring as part of the 
Cablevision process, but the parties disagreed about who performed them, and 
whether or not they were public.  Cablevision’s contention that the performances 
were not public turned on its assertion that the source copies for the individual 
transmissions had been “made” by the subscribers and that, because each playback 
transmission was launched from each user’s private copy, the performances too 
could only be private.42 
At trial, Judge Chin (sitting prior to his elevation to the Second Circuit) found 
that Cablevision’s involvement in the process was sufficient to justify a finding that 
it “made” the copies stored on its servers as well as the transmissions from those 
copies, and that the transmissions were “public” within the meaning of the Act.43 
The Second Circuit reversed.  It determined that the copies, albeit created using 
Cablevision’s facilities and stored on its servers, were “made” by the subscribers 
who selected the programs from among the offerings proposed by Cablevision.44  
In reaching that decision, the court approvingly cited Netcom, a 1995 Northern 
District of California decision that declined to hold an Internet service provider 
(ISP) directly liable when its facilities automatically reproduced a copyrighted 
work that had been posted by one of its users.45  The Netcom court reasoned that, 
 
 36. Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 615. 
 37. Id. at 615–16. 
 38. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 125. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 609. 
 41. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 124. 
 42. Id. at 126. 
 43. Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 622–23. 
 44. Before determining who “makes” the copies stored on the Cablevision servers, the Second 
Circuit ruled that the “buffer” copies that Cablevision made in the process of delivering the content from 
its real-time signal to its subscribers’ storage boxes on its servers were not sufficiently “fixed” in the 
buffers to amount to copies.  See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 127–30. 
 45. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal 
1995). 
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despite copyright’s strict liability standard, “there should still be some element of 
volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to 
create a copy by a third party.”46 
Having determined that the customers “made” the copies using Cablevision’s 
instrumentalities, the Second Circuit then considered whether a transmission of a 
performance from the customer’s individual source copy could be a “public” 
performance.  It first had to identify the “performance” referred to by the Transmit 
Clause.  This has been the subject of a great deal of controversy, stemming largely 
from a perceived grammatical ambiguity within the text.47  By stating that “[t]o 
perform . . . a work ‘publicly’ means . . . to transmit or otherwise communicate a 
performance . . . of the work . . . to the public,” the statute defines the act of 
transmitting a performance as one type of performing, even though the terms “to 
perform” and “to transmit” are separately defined as well.48  This overlap creates 
uncertainty as to whether the relevant performance is the performance created by 
the act of the transmission, as Cablevision argued, or the performance of the 
underlying work, the position taken by the broadcaster plaintiffs.49 
The Second Circuit ultimately held that, in the context of transmitting a 
performance to the public, Congress was referring “to the performance created by 
the act of transmission.”50  Having accepted that the transmission was the relevant 
performance, the Second Circuit reasoned that, since each RS-DVR transmission is 
made from a unique copy to a single subscriber, those performances could not be 
“to the public.”51  Certiorari was sought and denied.52 
Cablevision is crucial to understanding why Aereo’s technological design is not 
just logical, but perhaps even inevitable.  Simply, it appears to instruct technology 
providers that if they design their systems to enable each user to make unique 
personal copies, that structure could, in appropriate cases, effectively immunize the 
services from any liability under both the reproduction and the public performance 
rights.  Although the Second Circuit expressly cautioned that its holding “d[id] not 
generally permit content delivery networks to avoid all copyright liability by 
making copies of each item of content and associating one unique copy with each 
subscriber to the network, or by giving their subscribers the capacity to make their 
own individual copies,”53 the Second Circuit’s subsequent decision in Aereo 
demonstrates that this admonition did not, in fact, confine that court’s reading of 
the statute. 
 
 46. Id. at 1370. 
 47. Cf. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 135–39 (discussing and comparing differing interpretations of 
the Transmit Clause).  
 48. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 49. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 134. 
 50. Id. at 136. 
 51. Id. at 138. 
 52. Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 557 U.S. 946 (2009). 
 53. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 139. 
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b.  Aereo’s Treatment in the Lower Courts 
The district court ruled that Cablevision controlled, and that Aereo had therefore 
not “publicly performed” the television programs.54  A divided Second Circuit 
affirmed.  The Second Circuit majority reiterated its view that “the relevant inquiry 
under the Transmit Clause is the potential audience of a particular transmission, not 
the potential audience for the underlying work or the particular performance of that 
work being transmitted.”55  It also held that there were “two essential facts” that 
had led to the holding that Cablevision’s transmissions were not public 
performances:  (1) that its RS-DVR allowed each subscriber to create unique copies 
of each program and (2) that the transmission of the recording to a subscriber was 
from that unique copy.56  These features meant that “the potential audience of every 
RS-DVR transmission was only a single Cablevision subscriber, namely the 
subscriber who created the copy,” and that limitation meant that the transmission 
was not “to the public.”57  Aereo’s system had those same two features.58 
In dissent, Judge Chin (since elevated to the Second Circuit) charged that 
Aereo’s technical architecture was “a sham”: 
The system employs thousands of individual dime-sized antennas, but there is no 
technologically sound reason to use a multitude of tiny individual antennas rather than 
one central antenna; indeed, the system is a Rube Goldberg-like contrivance, over-
engineered in an attempt to avoid the reach of the Copyright Act and to take 
advantage of a perceived loophole in the law.59 
Rejecting the contention that holding that Aereo’s transmissions were not public 
performances would be “exalt[ing] form over substance, because the Aereo system 
is functionally equivalent to a cable television provider,”60 the majority nonetheless 
rejoined, “[T]hat Aereo was able to design a system based on Cablevision’s holding 
to provide its users with nearly live television over the internet is an argument that 
Cablevision was wrongly decided; it does not provide a basis for distinguishing 
Cablevision.”61  The majority noted that many other technology providers, 
particularly cloud computing services, had also designed their systems around 
Cablevision’s holdings.62  “Perhaps the application of the Transmit Clause should 
focus less on the technical details of a particular system and more on its 
functionality, but this Court’s decisions . . . held that technical architecture 
matters.”63  Acknowledging that it is more difficult to distinguish between public 
and private transmissions today than when Congress enacted the Transmit Clause 
 
 54. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 55. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 691 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 56. Id. at 689. 
 57. Id. at 689–90 (internal citations omitted). 
 58. Id. at 690. 
 59. Id. at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 693 (majority opinion). 
 61. Id. at 694. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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in 1976, the majority ultimately concluded that the language of the Act, as 
previously interpreted in Cablevision, dictated the conclusion that Aereo’s 
transmissions were not public performances.64 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
The Supreme Court reversed, with a six-to-three majority (Breyer, joined by 
Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan) holding that Aereo’s near-live 
service infringed the broadcasters’ exclusive right of public performance.65  Three 
justices dissented. 
The Court articulated two questions: 
 A.  Did Aereo perform at all? 
 B.  If yes, did it do so “to the public”? 
A.  DID AEREO PERFORM? 
One of the crucial questions before the Court was who performed the works—
Aereo, or the individual subscribers who requested that the recordings of the 
broadcasts be made and streamed?  That question was the source of the judicial 
split.  The dissent (Scalia, joined by Thomas and Alito) argued that Aereo did not 
perform at all since it lacked the requisite volition.66  The dissenters distinguished 
video-on-demand services, which exercise volition in the selection of content 
offered to consumers, from automated retransmission services, which simply relay 
an upstream transmission entity’s selection of programming proposed to users.67  
The majority, however, reached the opposite conclusion.  While noting that the 
language of the Act alone does not provide any demarcation between entities that 
themselves “perform” and those that merely supply equipment enabling others to 
do so, the majority found that, “read in light of its purpose, the Act is unmistakable:  
An entity that engages in activities like Aereo’s performs.”68  In an analysis that did 
not mention the concept of volition at all, the majority reasoned that Aereo’s 
activities were essentially akin to the activities of the community antenna television 
(CATV) providers that Congress had intended to cover in the 1976 Act: 
Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those of the CATV companies that 
Congress amended the Act to reach. . . . Aereo sells a service that allows subscribers 
to watch television programs, many of which are copyrighted, almost as they are 
being broadcast.  In providing this service, Aereo uses its own equipment, housed in a 
centralized warehouse, outside of its users’ homes.  By means of its technology 
(antennas, transcoders, and servers), Aereo’s system “receive[s] programs that have 
been released to the public and carr[ies] them by private channels to additional 
 
 64. Id. at 695. 
 65. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo III), 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).  
 66. Id. at 2512–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 2514.  
 68. Id. at 2504 (majority opinion). 
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viewers.”69 
This holding is a narrow one.  It instructs that a service will not be deemed a mere 
“equipment provider” when it is sufficiently analogous to a CATV operator, but the 
decision provides little guidance about whether and when a technology provider 
will be sufficiently involved in the infringement to justify the imposition of direct 
liability outside those circumstances.70 
B.  WERE THOSE PERFORMANCES “TO THE PUBLIC”? 
The majority next considered whether those performances were “to the public” 
within the meaning of the Act. 
Congress defined two different kinds of public performances.  One type is 
defined in the Transmit Clause, discussed above.71  The Act also provides that “[t]o 
perform or display a work “publicly” means . . . to perform or display it at a place 
open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of 
a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered . . . .”72 
The two discrete limbs of the definition aim at very different activities.  The first 
seeks to capture performances that are in public.  The second targets performances 
transmitted to places that may be public or private but, in either event, are to be 
received by “members of the public” and therefore are to the public.  In the case of 
performances transmitted to the public for receipt in private places, case law and 
secondary authority establish that a “substantial number of persons” need not, in 
fact, have received the transmission; rather it suffices that the performance of the 
work be offered to “members of the public.”73 
The decision of the Northern District of California in On Command Video most 
squarely confronts the distinction between the two limbs.  The court analyzed 
whether the electronic deliveries, upon request from a guest, of video signals to 
hotel rooms from a bank of cassette players in the hotel’s equipment room 
amounted to transmissions to “the public.”74  The hotel had structured its service so 
that no two guests could simultaneously view the content from the same cassette.  
The district court, following Ninth Circuit precedent,75 recognized that 
 
 69. Id. at 2506. 
 70. Cf. id. at 2511 (“We cannot now answer more precisely how the Transmit Clause or other 
provisions of the Copyright Act will apply to technologies not before us.”). 
 71. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 72. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 73. Some authorities have also pointed out the commercial character of transmissions held to 
have been made to “members of the public.”  See, e.g., On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures 
Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991).  In Cablevision I and in his dissent in Aereo II, Judge Chin 
cited the commercial character of the relationship to buttress his determination that the transmissions 
were to “paying strangers,” and thus “to the public.”  See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc.(Aereo II), 722 
F.3d 676, 699 (2d Cir. 2013) (Chin, J., dissenting); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision 
Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Giblin & Ginsburg, 
supra note *, at 28–29; infra text accompanying notes 158–162.  
 74. On Command Video, 777 F. Supp. 787. 
 75. The Ninth Circuit had held that a hotel’s “rental” of videocassettes to its customers for 
viewing in their rooms was not a public performance because the guest rooms, once occupied, were not 
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performances in hotel rooms did not occur “in” public places,76 but held that the 
video transmissions were nonetheless “to the public” for the purposes of the 
Transmit Clause because “the relationship between the transmitter of the 
performance . . . and the audience . . . is a commercial, ‘public’ one regardless of 
where the viewing takes place.”77  The relationship was “a commercial, ‘public’ 
one” because, while only one or two persons would occupy the room at any given 
time, members of the public were generally invited to become paying guests of the 
hotel.78 
In Aereo, the Supreme Court majority departed from this delineation by using 
the text of the first limb to help it define “the public” for the purposes of the 
second.  It explained that, although the Act does not define “the public,” it specifies 
that an entity performs publicly when it performs at “any place where a substantial 
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social 
acquaintances is gathered.”79  After repeatedly emphasizing the importance of 
transmissions directed to a “large” group of people in order to be “to the public,” 
the Court concluded that “an entity does not transmit to the public if it does not 
transmit to a substantial number of people outside of a family and its social 
circle.”80 
Thus, the Court’s treatment of “the public” for purposes of the Transmit Clause 
might be read as requiring actual transmission “to a substantial number of people 
outside of a family and its social circle,” implying both that a transmission must 
have been made, not merely offered, and that the audience receiving the 
transmission must be comprised of many persons.81  Such a reading would have 
serious and troubling implications.  Imagine a situation in which an entity offers to 
transmit the work to the public at large, or to the relevant public for the work, but 
few members of that public actually choose to listen or watch.  Does it follow that 
only those entities that cross an unspecified threshold of actual transmissions are 
“publicly performing”?  If so, then the “public” nature of a performance by 
transmission could not be ascertained without post-hoc head counting.  Not only 
would such an interpretation introduce uncertainty for copyright owners and 
exploiters alike, but it would also promote the kinds of baroque copyright-avoiding 
business models the Aereo Court discredited.  Given the Copyright Act’s inclusion 
in the public performance right of discrete transmissions to the public that are 
separated in time, were the public performance right to turn on receipt of the 
transmission by a substantial number of persons, then the service might be 
permitted to make an “insubstantial” number of on-demand transmissions before 
the number of transmissions tipped over into communicating the performance of 
 
“open to the public.”  Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc. v. Prof’l. Real Estate Invs., Inc., 866 F.2d 278, 281 
(9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). 
 76. Id. at 282. 
 77. On Command Video, 777 F. Supp. at 790. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo III), 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2509–10 (2014). 
 80. Id. at 2510–11. 
 81. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2511. 
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the work to a “substantial” number of unrelated persons.  If the service is in effect 
allowed up to, say, fifty “free” transmissions, then one might imagine the creation 
of a plethora of separately constituted subsidiary services each catering to no more 
than fifty members of the public. 
However, we do not believe that the Court’s judgment leads to this outcome.  
While the definition of “transmit” speaks in terms of actual communications of 
performances, the Transmit Clause itself refers to “members of the public capable 
of receiving the performance or display.”82  The “members of the public” capable 
of receiving the performance could be the public at large, or smaller subsets, such 
as devotees of cooking shows, or the fans of even a particularly obscure performer; 
what matters is that the potential audience be otherwise unrelated to the copyright 
owner or to each other.  By the same token, even if a service structures the 
transmission so that only one person may ever receive it (for example, as a 
“private” live stream from a concert performance), but solicits members of the 
public to attempt to be the lucky winner, the performance still would be made to a 
“member of the public.”  The statutory language of the second limb focuses on 
whether the transmission is offered to people in their capacity as members of the 
public, rather than on the number of actual recipients. 
Significantly, the Aereo Court did not in fact engage in the head-counting 
exercise its analysis could be read as requiring.  It did not inquire into how many of 
Aereo’s users actually accessed each broadcast, nor did it suggest that those 
numbers may be significant to its finding of infringement.  As recent data show, 
Aereo had less than 80,000 subscribers across ten cities as of late 2013.83  
Presumably then, at least some protected works would have been streamed by just 
one or a handful of users.  Perhaps some works attracted no users at all.  Had the 
Court really intended public performance liability to turn on numerous actual 
recipients rather than on an offer of transmissions to members of the public, the 
Court could have been expected to differentiate between content merely offered 
and content actually transmitted in making its determination of liability.   
Justice Breyer’s statement of the controversy at the beginning of his judgment 
may also suggest that it is the offering of the content rather than its actual receipt 
that is legally significant: 
We must decide whether respondent Aereo, Inc., infringes this exclusive right [of 
public performance] by selling its subscribers a technologically complex service that 
allows them to watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time as 
the programs are broadcast over the air.  We conclude that it does.84 
 
 82. The legislative history of the 1976 Act indicates that Congress anticipated the possibility that 
individual users would initiate on-demand performances by transmission; the relevant characteristic of 
the performance is that it is to “members of the public,” not that the number of “individual members” be 
substantial.  See H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 29 (1967) (foreseeing “the case of sounds or images stored in 
an information system and capable of being performed or displayed at the initiative of individual 
members of the public.”). 
 83. Dwight Silverman, Aereo Reveals Some Subscriber Numbers, and They’re Tiny, SEATTLE PI, 
Jul. 22, 2014, http://perma.cc/L4MV-7ZWN. 
 84. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.  Similarly:  “Considered alone, the language of the Act does not 
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This language suggests that what triggers the infringement is the provision of a 
service that “allows” subscribers to view the programs, not the viewings 
themselves.  This interpretation would be consistent with the United States’ 
international obligations.  Article 8 of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) Copyright Treaty obliges member states to protect the copyright holders’ 
right of communication to the public, “including the making available to the public 
of their works in such a way that members of the public may access these works 
from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.”  In Europe, in construing 
the EU Information Society Directive’s identical language, the Court of Justice of 
the European Union has ruled that the “public” character of the “making available” 
right turns on whether the defendant has offered the work to a “large number of 
persons”—not whether it has in fact been received.85  Thus, “a work is made 
available to a public in such a way that the persons forming that public may access 
it, irrespective of whether they avail themselves of that opportunity.”86 
For all of these reasons, the Aereo Court’s holding is likely to be more nuanced 
than an initial reading might suggest.  Providers will not be liable for damages for 
merely making available a service that might be used to transmit content.  There 
would be no monetary relief for public performances of works that have not 
actually been communicated to someone because in those cases there would be no 
“performance.”  However, once a performance has occurred, it should not matter 
how many individuals actually received it, only whether it was available to a 
“large” or “substantial” number.87  And, of course, to enjoin prospective 
performances, it is not necessary that the performance have occurred; the author 
would have an action to prevent the on-demand transmission to the public of 
streams of copyrighted works even if no member of the public has yet requested the 
transmission.  But while we find the Court’s requirement that the audience be large 
necessarily refers to the potential audience, any size criterion is still likely to be 
problematic for reasons we explore more fully below. 
 
clearly indicate when an entity ‘perform[s]’ (or ‘transmit[s]’) and when it merely supplies equipment 
that allows others to do so.  But when read in light of its purpose, the Act is unmistakable:  An entity 
that engages in activities like Aereo’s performs.”  Id. at 2504.  Those activities include not only 
transmitting the content, but also offering the service to subscribers.  See id. at 2506–07.  
 85. Case C-466/12, Svensson v. Sverigen, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX 62012CJ0466, ¶¶ 19, 21 (Feb. 
13, 2014). 
 86. Id. ¶ 19.  
 87. Under U.S. law, at least one actual transmission may have to be made in order for the work to 
have been publicly performed.  The difference in terminology between the “making available” right 
stated in the WIPO treaties, and the U.S. right “to perform the work publicly” may mean that while the 
international right is triggered regardless of any actual transmission, the U.S. right is articulated in terms 
that call for separate interpretation of “to perform” and “to perform publicly.”  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2012).  Offering a performance to the public meets the second element of “to perform publicly,” but the 
first element, that there be a “performance,” remains.  (Proof of the occurrence of at least one 
performance might potentially be obtained from the transmitting entities’ server logs, records detailing 
subscriber use of the service or by subpoenaing members.) 
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C.  CONSIDERATIONS COUNTERING A FINDING OF “PUBLIC” PERFORMANCE 
Two additional wrinkles in the majority’s analysis of what it means for a 
performance to be “to the public” prompt further queries.  First, it stated that “those 
who act as owners or possessors of the relevant product” do not constitute “the 
public.”88  Second, the majority noted, without further explanation, that “the 
doctrine of ‘fair use’ can help to prevent inappropriate or inequitable applications 
of the Clause.”89 
1.  “Owners or Possessors” 
The Court accompanied its observation that “those who act as owners or 
possessors of the relevant product” do not constitute “the public” with the further 
explanation that, “when an entity performs to a set of people, whether they 
constitute ‘the public’ often depends upon their relationship to the underlying 
work.”90 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time a U.S. court has recognized 
the relevance of the nature of the relationship between the copyrighted work or 
copyright owner and the audience.  Case law considering the meaning of “the 
public” in this context has been surprisingly spare, but what authorities exist have, 
until now, focused on the relationship between the performing entity and the 
audience.  For example, as described above, the court in On Command Video held 
that the video transmissions were indeed “to the public” for the purposes of the 
Transmit Clause because “the relationship between the transmitter of the 
performance . . . and the audience . . . is a commercial, ‘public’ one regardless of 
where the viewing takes place.”91  Paul Goldstein agrees that the relationship 
between the sender and the recipient is vital in determining whether a transmission 
is “to the public”: 
In the case of a transmission to a guest house, the relationship between the 
homeowner and the recipients of the transmission is not one between an individual 
and the public, rather is between an individual and his friends or family.  By contrast, 
the relationship between a trailer court manager and guests in the court is one between 
an individual and the public, as it is in the case of a hotel and its guests.92 
Judge Chin adopted On Command when he decided Cablevision at first instance,93 
and further highlighted the importance of the relationship between the transmitter 
and the audience in his Aereo dissent.  There, he reasoned that “a transmission to 
 
 88. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2510. 
 89. Id. at 2511. 
 90. Id. at 2510. 
 91. On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 778, 790 (N.D. Cal. 
1991). 
 92. 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 7.7.2.2, at 7:168.2 (3d ed. Supp. 2012-2) 
[hereinafter GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT]. 
 93. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 2d 
607, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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anyone other than oneself or an intimate relation is a communication to a 
‘member[] of the public,’ because it is not in any sense ‘private.’”94  Thus, Aereo’s 
transmissions were “to the public” because they were being disseminated to 
“paying strangers”; it was irrelevant that the potential audience of each 
transmission was restricted to a single member of the public.95 
While pre-Aereo authorities squarely emphasized the relationship between the 
sender and recipient of the performance to determine whether it has been made “to 
the public,” we have previously argued that the relationship between the recipient 
of the transmission and a copy of the copyrighted work is crucial.96  The Supreme 
Court’s observation that whether or not recipients of a transmission are “the public” 
often depends upon their relationship to the underlying work suggests that this 
heretofore neglected consideration is now indeed an important part of the analysis. 
Unfortunately, however, the significance of that factor is not yet clear.  The 
Court’s reference to “owners or possessors” is, at best, very imprecise; the service’s 
customer is unlikely to be an owner of “the work” because “the work” is the 
incorporeal object whose “owner” is the author or other copyright owner.  
Presumably, based on the submissions by the amicus curiae briefs, including the 
United States,97 the Court was positing the request by a customer of a remote 
storage service to play back a digital copy that she was entitled—by express or 
implied license, or under the fair use doctrine—to deposit in a digital storage 
locker.  In that event, even if multiple customers separately stored the same content 
with the service, the latter’s subsequent on-demand playback of performances of 
the same work to those customers would not be a transmission to “the public” by 
the service or the customer:  “the term ‘the public’ . . . does not extend to those who 
act as owners or possessors of the relevant product.”98  “Product” in this context 
apparently includes a license to access the stored content, whether by uploading it 
from a physical copy that its owner lawfully digitized, or by purchasing a download 
subsequently stored on a remote source.99  When a digital storage service plays 
content acquired and stored by customers back to those customers, then, there is no 
public performance. 
Moreover, in addition to the customer’s entitlement to access (which the Court 
treated as a possessory relationship) the customer-stored content, the Court 
introduced a further consideration:  “And we have not considered whether the 
public performance right is infringed when the user of a service pays primarily for 
something other than the transmission of copyrighted works, such as the remote 
storage of content.”100  There, the Court appears to be focusing on the nature of the 
 
 94. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 699 (2d Cir. 2013) (Chin, J., 
dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 698. 
 96. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note *, at 33–41.   
 97. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. 
Aereo, Inc. (Aereo III), 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 828079. 
 98. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2510. 
 99. Cf. id. at 2510–11 (distinguishing situations where a user receives a performance through a 
service provider in the user’s capacity as owner or possessor of the underlying work). 
 100. Id. at 2511. 
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commercial relationship between the customer and the transmitting service.  
Remote storage services transmit content to members of the public (their 
subscribers) when files hosted on their servers are played back to users on 
request.101  Unlike pay (or listen) on demand, however, the service for which the 
members of the public are paying is not the opportunity to receive transmissions of 
performances of particular works offered by the service, but rather to store 
whatever content the users post—whatever its source—and make it accessible 
remotely.  The customers pay the same subscription fees whatever the content they 
store and access.  Thus, while there is a public that pays in dollars or by being 
subjected to advertising (or other costs of “free” commercial services),102 the public 
is not specifically paying for transmissions of performances of any given 
copyrighted works. 
Whether a service is performing “publicly,” then, appears to turn on the nature 
of the service for which customers are paying.  Any service’s customers are likely 
to be members of the public, but the same act by the service—transmitting a 
performance of a given work—may or may not be a public performance depending 
on the existence of some kind of possessory relationship between the individual 
members of the public and a copy of or a license to use the content, and depending 
on whether the service is primarily offering streaming access to service-specified 
copyrighted works. 
2.  Fair Use 
The majority also posited that in appropriate cases, even if the service is deemed 
to be “publicly performing” third party content, the fair use doctrine might excuse 
the transmission and thus “prevent inappropriate or inequitable applications of the 
Clause.”103  The majority did not, however, go on to apply that doctrine to the 
Aereo facts, thereby indicating that it did not think Aereo presented even an 
arguable case for fair use.  As a result, whether other, less cable-like, storage and 
transmission services might be engaging in fair use is left to future controversies. 
III.  QUESTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The Court’s narrowly-phrased decision leaves the precise scope of the Transmit 
Clause uncertain.  Among the questions the opinion raises, we analyze the 
 
 101. Arguably, if the customer is requesting playback of content she selected and stored in “her” 
cloud locker, the service’s role in the communication might be too passive, limited to the technical relay 
of the content, to be deemed the party who “performs” the content.  See id. at 2507 (“In other cases 
involving different kinds of service or technology providers, a user’s involvement in the operation of the 
provider’s equipment and selection of the content transmitted may well bear on whether the provider 
performs within the meaning of the Act.”).   
 102. The analysis would be different, however, if the service targeted advertising to the played-
back content.  At that point, the “commercial relationship” between the service and the consumer would 
focus on particular works; the service would have foregone the content-neutrality that justifies a 
conclusion that the service is not publicly performing the played-back works. 
 103. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2511. 
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following: 
A.  What does the Court’s decision mean for the “volition” predicate introduced 
by the Second Circuit?  Who “makes” the copies and transmissions? 
B.  Would otherwise identical services that offer delayed time shifting (and no 
near-live transmissions) also be “performing publicly”? 
C.  What are the implications of the decision for other technology providers, 
including cloud storage providers, that look less like cable TV operators? 
A.  WHAT DOES AEREO MEAN FOR “VOLITION”?  WHO “MAKES” THE COPIES 
AND TRANSMISSIONS? 
1.  Volition and Transmission 
Remarkably, the Aereo majority did not mention the concept of volition at all.  
That silence in the face of the dissenters’ emphatic interpolation of a “volition” 
predicate might suggest that the majority considers volition irrelevant to the 
assessment of whether the defendant has publicly performed a work.  The 
majority’s analysis of whether Aereo “perform[s] at all” distinguishes between the 
mere provision of equipment and “engag[ing] in activities like Aereo’s.”104  The 
majority underscored Congress’ rejection in the 1976 Act of the Court’s 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. and Teleprompter Corp. v. 
Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. precedents.105  In those decisions, the Court 
had held that traditional cable TV retransmission services were not “performing” 
the works that the services retransmitted to their customers because the customers 
chose which programs to watch, and the services were merely providing equipment 
that the customers might themselves have installed (given the Court’s rather 
fanciful evocation of the customers’ acts, such as placing an aerial on a 
mountaintop and stringing a wire from the mountaintop to the customer’s home).106  
Congress’ subsequent amendment of the Copyright Act was intended to ensure that 
cable operators were considered “perform[ers]” of the retransmitted works and 
therefore fell within the scope of the Act.107  According to the Aereo Court, a 
service “performs” copyrighted works, rather than simply supplies equipment, 
when it “uses its own equipment, housed in a centralized warehouse, outside of its 
users’ homes,” to transmit performances of works to viewers, even when that 
equipment “may . . . emulate equipment a viewer could use at home,” and even 
when the customers selected which particular programs to watch from among the 
 
 104. Id. at 2504 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 105. Id. at 2504–05 (citing Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 
(1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968)). 
 106. See Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 308–09; Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398–400. 
 107. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976) (“[A] cable television system is performing when it 
retransmits [a network] broadcast to its subscribers.”).  The Aereo Court elaborated that “[t]he 
[Transmit] Clause thus makes clear that an entity that acts like a CATV system itself performs, even if 
when doing so, it simply enhances viewers’ ability to receive broadcast television signals.”  Aereo III, 
134 S. Ct. at 2506. 
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totality of the broadcasts the service made available for retransmission.108  The 
majority therefore appears to stress the service’s active engagement in the 
transmission, and its similarity to the CATV providers whose activities the Act was 
intended to cover, rather than any specific “volition” with respect to the particular 
content transmitted. 
Indeed, the majority’s rejection of the dissent’s characterization of Aereo’s 
service as “a copy shop that provides its patrons with a library card,”109 underscores 
the irrelevance of the customer’s program selection to the determination of whether 
the service has “performed” the works it transmits.  The Court also declined to 
attribute any significance to the additional layer of consumer intervention involved 
in Aereo’s system relative to cable systems:  while cable systems retransmit sua 
sponte, Aereo does not activate the subscriber’s antenna without the subscriber’s 
request.  Adopting a pragmatic perspective, the Court announced that “this 
difference means nothing to the subscriber.  It means nothing to the broadcaster.”110 
Nonetheless, the Court did not completely discount the role of the user in the 
determination of “who performs” a work:  “a user’s involvement in the operation of 
the provider’s equipment and selection of the content transmitted may well bear on 
whether the provider performs within the meaning of the Act.”111  This statement is 
a far cry from adopting the kind of “volition” predicate urged by the dissent (or, for 
that matter, by the Second Circuit in Cablevision), but it nonetheless suggests that 
when the service is less “cable-like” than Aereo, the majority’s distinction between 
providing the equipment that enables a performance, and actually “performing,” 
remains uncertain. 
In any event, it should be clear, even under the dissent’s characterization, that 
specific “volition” as to the transmission of particular content is not required for the 
communication to be considered a “public performance.”  All justices agreed that 
video on-demand services are “performing,” and it should not matter how 
automated the process:  once the service assembles the selection of the programs 
from which the consumer may choose and then offers them commercially to the 
public, the service has gone beyond merely providing transmission facilities.  For 
the majority, cable and cable-like services still “perform” even though they did not 
originate the selection of programming offered to the users (the broadcasters did, 
though the cable operators select the source broadcast stations whose content they 
retransmit), and even though the users ultimately choose which programs to watch, 
by turning a knob on the television, or clicking on a website.  (Of course, the last 
feature of user involvement is common to on-demand transmissions, too.)  If on-
demand services occupy one end of the “who performs” continuum, and cable-like 
 
 108. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2506–07. 
 109. The dissent’s analogy, and its purported distinction from pay-per-view services (which the 
dissent acknowledges do “perform” the user-selected works) is in any event highly problematic.  Id. at 
2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The key distinction, for the dissent, is that video-on-demand services 
“choose the content.”  Id. at 2513 (emphasis in original).  But that distinction in fact fails:  libraries 
(other than the Library of Congress) do not acquire every book published; they choose the books that 
comprise their collections. 
 110. Id. at 2507 (majority opinion). 
 111. Id. 
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services stand at an intermediate—but still “performing”—point, services that offer 
remote storage (but are entirely agnostic as to the content users store) might be 
located at the other end. 
2.  “Volition” and the Reproduction Right 
While Aereo addressed only the public performance right, the majority’s opinion 
raises questions about the continued application of the “volition” standard to the 
reproduction right.  The majority provided no explicit guidance about the 
circumstances in which a technology provider will be taken to have engaged in the 
relevant act except where they are closely analogous to CATV providers.  The 
dissent criticized the majority’s reasoning on this point for, among other things, 
bypassing the volitional conduct test without providing any useful framework to 
replace it.112  In the absence of any such guidance, future courts may adopt a hybrid 
standard:  that Aereo applies where the defendant is sufficiently cable-like, and the 
volition standard prevails in other cases. We consider the implications of the 
majority decision for the future operation of “volition” in the technical analysis 
below and in our debate about the merits of the decision. 
B.  WOULD OTHERWISE IDENTICAL SERVICES THAT OFFER DELAYED 
TIMESHIFTING (AND NO NEAR-LIVE TRANSMISSIONS) ALSO BE “PERFORMING 
PUBLICLY”? 
The Supreme Court’s decision covered only Aereo’s near-live offering.  It did 
not address Aereo’s timeshifting facility, which enables users to record a program 
for viewing at a more convenient time.113  In the remand proceedings, Aereo 
argued that any injunction should exclude that aspect of its service, and that 
transmissions would be sufficiently delayed to fall outside the scope of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling if they started streaming as little as ten minutes after the 
original broadcast commenced airing.114  The district court instead issued an 
injunction barring Aereo from transmitting any program while it was still being 
broadcast, reserving for determination at trial questions about the legality of 
transmissions made after broadcast.115  Aereo has now filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection, and it appears unlikely that there will be any such trial.116 
Whether or not Aereo would have been liable for transmitting pre-recorded 
programs after they finished airing would have depended on whether Aereo was 
found to be the performer of those transmissions, and, if so, whether the 
performances are “to the public.”  The answer to those questions would apply 
equally to neighboring technologies like Cablevision’s RS-DVR, which similarly 
 
 112. Id. at 2515–16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 113. See id. at 2503 (majority opinion). 
 114. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo IV), Nos. 12-cv-1540 & 12-cv-1543, 2014 
WL 5393867, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014). 
 115. Id. at *8–10. 
 116. See The Next Chapter, supra note 14. 
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utilizes remotely hosted equipment to make recordings that are later transmitted to 
the user for watching at a more convenient time.  In determining the legality of that 
product in 2008, the Second Circuit had ruled that the relevant performance was the 
specific transmission made from each unique copy and reasoned that, since the 
audience of that transmission could only be a specific individual, the transmission 
could not be “to the public.”117  The Second Circuit did not consider who engaged 
in those performances, because its finding that the performances were not “public” 
obviated that issue.118  Now that the Second Circuit’s analysis of the “public” 
character of the performances is no longer good law post-Aereo, it is useful to 
consider whether the Supreme Court’s holdings mean that other kinds of providers 
of remote timeshifting services would be “performing publicly.” 
The technology that underpins Aereo’s near-live and prospective delayed 
offerings is exactly the same.119  In both instances, recordings are made and then 
streamed online to the requesting viewer.  The only real difference is that the 
timeshifting viewer watches those recordings at a later time.  But even though 
nothing changes other than the lapse of time between the original broadcast and its 
subsequent retransmission by the service that recorded the broadcast, the majority’s 
reasoning could yield a different answer to the questions both of “who performs” 
the work, and of whether the performance is “to the public.”  The following 
analysis attempts to answer those questions based on a hypothetical version of 
Aereo that would permit users to stream back their requested recordings only after 
the programs finish airing. 
1.  Who “Performs” the Timeshifted Transmissions? 
The Supreme Court majority held Aereo to be the performer of the near-live 
transmissions because its activities in that regard were so similar to those of the 
cable companies the Act was amended to reach.  The majority did not perceive 
sufficient pertinence in the “sole technological difference” between cable 
retransmission systems and Aereo itself—that Aereo’s system did not transmit until 
activated by the subscriber:  “this difference means nothing to the subscriber.  It 
means nothing to the broadcaster.”120  By contrast, the majority acknowledged that 
“[i]n other cases involving different kinds of service or technology providers, a 
user’s involvement in the operation of the provider’s equipment and selection of 
the content transmitted may well bear on whether the provider performs within the 
meaning of the Act.”121  But the majority did not elaborate on what these “other 
cases” might be. 
In the case of the delayed timeshifting services provided by both Aereo 
 
 117. See supra text accompanying notes 44–53. 
 118. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
 119. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 681 (2d Cir. 2013); Transcript 
of Hearing on Preliminary Injunction at 12, Aereo IV, 2014 WL 5393867 (Nos. 12-cv-1540 & 12-cv-
1543) [hereinafter Aereo IV Hearing Transcript].  
 120. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo III), 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2507 (2014). 
 121. Id.  
GIBLIN & GINSBURG, WE (STILL) NEED TO TALK ABOUT AEREO, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 109 (2015)  
2015] WE (STILL) NEED TO TALK ABOUT AEREO 129 
(hypothetically) and Cablevision (in fact), the system neither transmits until 
activation by a subscriber, nor permits subscribers to watch recordings of programs 
as they are simultaneously being broadcast, nor determines when the subscriber 
may watch the programs.122  Thus, the parallel to the CATV providers of the 1970s 
arguably reduces to the services’ common use of their own equipment (stored in 
centralized warehouses).  Would that factor in itself be sufficient to support a 
finding that the service was the performer?  It is our view that a service provider 
might be considered closely analogous to a cable provider even where it transmits 
content only after it has finished airing.  For example, were Aereo to offer to 
automatically begin its timeshifted transmissions directly after the initial broadcast, 
so that subscribers could in effect continuously stream TV with a slight delay, a 
court may find that Aereo still looks sufficiently analogous to such a provider. 
Once the cable TV provider analogy fails, however, perhaps because of too great 
a lapse of time between the original broadcast and its subsequent retransmission 
(how great is “too great” remaining undefined), Aereo’s reliance on kinship to 
cable provides only limited comfort to plaintiffs wishing to make a case that remote 
DVR providers themselves “perform.”  The Aereo Court carefully avoided giving 
any explicit guidance about “who performs” in circumstances outside the cable TV 
analogy.123  The Court left the scope of its decision ambiguous by stating that “the 
history of cable broadcast transmissions that led to the enactment of the Transmit 
Clause informs our conclusion that Aereo ‘perform[s],’ but it does not determine 
whether different kinds of providers in different contexts also ‘perform.’”124 
This remark does not warrant a negative inference that different providers in 
different contexts do not perform.  It does not necessarily follow that only those 
remote transmission services that can be assimilated to cable services are 
“performing” the works they transmit.  We can identify some additional factors that 
might in future cases be deemed relevant to determining who “performs.”  As 
discussed above, in finding Aereo to be the performer in the case of its near-live 
TV service, the Court focused on Aereo’s active engagement in the 
transmissions.125  The timeshifting services supplied by Aereo and Cablevision not 
only store and play back works, but also initially propose that content to their 
subscribers.126  As a result, they closely resemble video-on-demand services.  The 
 
 122. In the case of Cablevision’s RS-DVR, we make this assumption on the basis of the Second 
Circuit’s explanations of that technology in its 2008 judgment.  There it was explained that Cablevision 
would split the stream of data received from various content providers into two—one of which would be 
immediately routed to customers in the same way as before the RS-DVR existed, and the other of which 
would be diverted to a different server and from which copies would be made upon request from 
subscribers.  It may well be possible for a user to both view a program and record it at the same time.  
However, the signals that the user is watching live would seem to fall within Cablevision’s 
retransmission license.  The public would not be able to watch the recorded copy as it was being made—
only play it back after broadcast.  Accordingly, in this scenario (as for the case of Aereo’s hypothetical 
timeshifting service) timeshifted copies could not be viewed until after the recording is completed.   
 123. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2510−11.  
 124. Id. at 2510. 
 125. See id. at 2506; see also supra notes 69, 108 and accompanying text. 
 126. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2506–07; Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 
(Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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principal difference is the constitution of the selection of programming offered to 
subscribers; rather than assembling the offered repertoire itself, the services act as 
conduits for the broadcasters’ selections.  Third party origination of the selection of 
programming suggests that timeshifting services have less “volition” than a 
traditional video-on-demand provider, but nonetheless still have a significant 
degree of active participation in the activity, particularly if the services select 
among the broadcast channels whose programs the services record and retransmit.  
Whether the addition of this conduct to the remote storage and transmission 
activities suffices to characterize those services as “performing” the works is yet to 
be seen, but will no doubt be vigorously argued by future plaintiffs.127 
2.  If the Remote Timeshifting Service Performs, Does It Do So “to the 
Public”? 
Even if Aereo and Cablevision were found to be the performers of the 
timeshifted transmissions, the majority’s analysis raises the further question 
whether, in the case of delayed transmissions for the purpose of timeshifting, the 
services are performing “to the public.” 
The majority held that Aereo made its near-live transmissions “to the public” 
because it transmitted them to large numbers of subscribers who lacked any prior 
relationship to the works, and who were paying primarily to watch broadcast 
television programs.128  However, Aereo’s and Cablevision’s timeshifting services 
record full copies of works to users’ individual storage lockers prior to the eventual 
delayed transmission,129 thus giving the users some “prior relationship” to the 
works.  If those users then receive the transmissions in their capacities as lawful 
owners or possessors of the underlying works, that will be relevant to whether they 
constitute “the public” for purposes of the subsequent transmission.130  In addition, 
those timeshifters are not paying primarily to watch near-live TV, but for the ability 
to watch televised content at a more convenient time—something that the Supreme 
Court, in a different technological environment, had previously held to be a fair 
use.131 
The majority, having evoked fair use, did not explain why that exception did not 
exculpate Aereo’s near-live transmissions.132  However, the Court’s finding that the 
 
 127. We explore below, see infra text accompanying notes 234–239, the legal analysis of another 
way in which Aereo might redesign its service to elude liability for public performances:  rather than 
streaming the content of the recorded programs to its subscribers (the Cablevision model), it might 
simply transmit the file to the subscriber as a download, for the subscriber to subsequently open and 
play.  In this scenario, Aereo would be transmitting a file, not a “performance” (since the work would 
not be contemporaneously perceptible with its communication).  Whether Aereo’s response to its 
subscriber’s request for delivery of the copy would violate the § 106(3) distribution right would depend 
on whether the act of delivery is attributed to Aereo or to the subscriber.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012). 
 128. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2510. 
 129. Id. at 2503; Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 125. 
 130. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2510. 
 131. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that 
consumer uses of Sony’s Betamax VCR to timeshift free broadcast television programming are fair use). 
 132. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2511. 
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service, rather than the subscriber, engaged in the transmission may well have 
doomed a fair use defense.  U.S. law has traditionally operated less favorably to 
commercial service providers that act on a user’s behalf than to the user herself.133  
Thus, copy shops may be liable for making infringing copies, even if the copying 
would have amounted to educational fair use had it been done by the ultimate user 
on her own behalf.134  In one such case, the Sixth Circuit observed that “courts 
have . . . properly rejected attempts by for-profit users to stand in the shoes of their 
customers making nonprofit or noncommercial uses.”135  In a subsequent case 
involving the sale of karaoke discs, that court reiterated that “the end-user’s 
utilization of the product is largely irrelevant; instead, the focus is on whether the 
alleged infringer’s use is transformative and/or commercial.”136  Thus, while a 
viewer arguably has a fair use right to stream local free-to-air content when she was 
freely entitled to do so via a rooftop antenna, it is unlikely that Aereo had the right 
to do so, on the viewer’s behalf, for profit. 
We have posited that the service’s involvement in the selecting, proposing, 
storing and transmitting the content may potentially lead to its designation as the 
entity that “performs” the work.  Nonetheless, even if it is the provider that 
performs, the users’ prior relationship to the works, and their payment for access to 
timeshifted works rather than to near-live broadcast TV, may introduce sufficient 
distinctions to support a finding that those performances are not “to the public.”  
But that conclusion depends on the assumption that the copies were lawfully made 
by virtue of an end-user timeshifting fair use exception.  In fact, we should not treat 
Sony as imprimatur for any and all timeshifting whatsoever.137  Sony was far from a 
blanket authorization of any and all consumer time-deferred copying of television 
broadcasts.  While the Sony Court assumed that consumers should be entitled to 
watch at their convenience programming that they had been invited to view for 
free,138 the Court reached the conclusion that the copies made there were 
noninfringing only after considering market harm, cost and difficulty of copying, 
 
 133. Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyright Law – Part II, Caselaw:  Exclusive 
Rights on the Ebb?, 218 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 167, 224 (2008) [hereinafter 
Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyright Law]; WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 7:3 
(2014). 
 134. See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1531−32 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).  
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are done for nonprofit purposes.  See, e.g., Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 
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7:3 (2014)). 
 136. Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 582 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 137. See, e.g., Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, L.C.C. (Fox I), 905 F.Supp.2d 1088 (C.D. Cal. 
2012), aff’d by Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C. (Fox II), 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013), 
amended and superseded on denial of reh’g en banc by Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C. (Fox 
III), No. 12-57048, 2014 WL 260572 (9th Cir. Jan 24, 2014). 
 138. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421, 423–25 & n. 8 (1984). 
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and the nonexistence of copyright owner-supplied alternatives to inconvenient 
broadcast times.139 
Technologies such as Aereo are readily distinguishable from Sony’s Betamax.  
Most importantly, they have much more potential to compete with remunerated 
markets for making the same content conveniently available on demand (which 
have developed significantly since the 1980s, now offering multiple alternative 
viewing opportunities to the original broadcast time).  Moreover, the technologies 
have eliminated a great deal of “friction” from the copying process (notably, as in 
the case of Dish’s AutoHop service, by automatically deleting the 
advertisements140).  In an environment where there is less and less difference 
between commercially-aided timeshifting and video on demand (which indubitably, 
even for the dissenters, implicates the public performance right), the reflexive 
assumption that timeshifting equals fair use should be questioned.  If users do not 
in fact have a legitimate, possessory relationship to the content, under the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning, that may change the performance into one to the “public.” 
C.  WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION FOR OTHER TECHNOLOGY 
PROVIDERS? 
One of the biggest concerns in the lead-up to the Supreme Court’s decision was 
the fear that a finding against Aereo could impose enormous collateral damage 
upon other technology providers, particularly the cloud storage industry.141  The 
majority clearly expressed its intention to draft its holding narrowly to avoid such 
outcomes.142  However, it declined to elaborate on the implications of its holdings 
for most other kinds of Internet-based enterprises.143  Here, we consider what the 
Supreme Court’s decision might mean for a range of technology providers, 
including those that supply cloud storage, Slingboxes, “tablet TVs” and live TV 
streaming, in order to tease out the boundaries of its ruling. 
 
 139. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note *, at 35.  
 140. See infra text accompanying notes 163–165. 
 141. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 20. 
 142. In the words of the Court: 
We agree that Congress, while intending the Transmit Clause to apply broadly to cable 
companies and their equivalents, did not intend to discourage or to control the emergence or use 
of different kinds of technologies.  But we do not believe that our limited holding today will have 
that effect. 
. . . [T]he history of cable broadcast transmissions that led to the enactment of the Transmit 
Clause informs our conclusion that Aereo “perform[s],” but it does not determine whether 
different kinds of providers in different contexts also “perform.” . . . 
. . . . 
We cannot now answer more precisely how the Transmit Clause or other provisions of the 
Copyright Act will apply to technologies not before us.  We agree with the Solicitor General that 
“[q]uestions involving cloud computing, [remote storage] DVRs, and other novel issues not 
before the Court, as to which ‘Congress has not plainly marked [the] course,’ should await a case 
in which they are squarely presented.’” 
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo III), 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2510–11 (2014). 
 143. Id. at 2511.  
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1.  Cloud Storage 
Before the Supreme Court handed down its ruling, there was widespread 
concern that a reading of the Transmit Clause that captured Aereo might also 
impose new liability on each cloud provider whose users streamed copyright-
protected works from their personal storage “lockers.”144 
Dropbox, one of the most popular online services, epitomizes the likely 
implications for cloud storage providers.  Dropbox’s pitch is simple—it offers 
“[y]our stuff, anywhere.”145 Dropbox copies and synchronizes content between 
multiple devices, and has been designed to make those processes as simple as 
possible for users.146  The subscriber needs only to install the application, log in 
and start putting material in a folder.147  Dropbox then actively monitors that folder, 
automatically copies and synchronizes users’ files across each of their devices via 
the Internet once new content is added, and encrypts those files when they reach its 
servers.148  Subscribers may then access it from phones, tablets and anywhere with 
an Internet connection.  Accounts are private:  only the account owner or a person 
she has expressly authorized may access the content stored within them.149 
Imagine that a user records a broadcast of a particular NFL football game, and, 
intending to watch it at a more convenient time, uploads that recording to her 
private Dropbox account.  When she later streams the recorded broadcast from her 
Dropbox, is Dropbox engaging in an infringing public performance? 
The starting point of the analysis under Aereo must be to ask who engages in the 
transmission.150  Dropbox has little resemblance to the CATV providers the 1976 
Act was intended to capture.  It does not sell a service that allows subscribers to 
watch television programs; it sells a service that allows subscribers to remotely 
store any kind of content at all.  There is nothing about that service that is 
specifically designed to enable users to watch TV simultaneously or near 
simultaneously with the broadcast.  Dropbox does own and host the storage 
equipment, but it does not provide the antenna or transcoder equipment necessary 
to receive and convert the broadcast signals—those must be obtained elsewhere by 
the user.  And Dropbox does not propose the content to the users to store and play 
back.  Given the majority’s careful confinement of its “who performs?” analysis to 
technology providers analogous to CATV providers, and its explicit reference to 
cloud storage providers in noting that the right may not be infringed where service 
users “pay[] primarily for something other than the transmission of copyrighted 
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works,”151 the Aereo judgment does not suggest that Dropbox would be the one 
performing. 
Even if Dropbox were “performing,” it seems unlikely that it would be doing so 
“to the public.”  Dropbox has millions of subscribers,152 and presumably sometimes 
substantial numbers of users with no relationship to one another do store and 
stream the same works.  However, those subscribers have a clear prior relationship 
to the work (in that they have uploaded the file after making the initial recording) 
and, rather than paying Dropbox primarily to watch copyright-protected works, 
they pay primarily for the benefit of that storage.  Accordingly, these performances 
would not be “to the public” and should therefore fall outside the scope of the 
copyright owners’ exclusive rights.  In our view, Aereo successfully tailored its 
ruling to protect Dropbox-type cloud storage providers from public performance 
liability. 
2.  “Slinging” Technologies Such as Hopper with Sling and TiVo Stream 
The current generation of home DVRs that incorporate “slinging” technologies 
provides a particularly intriguing case study in testing the implications of the 
Supreme Court’s decision.  Slinging is the practice of shifting to another location 
content that consumers are entitled to watch in a different place. 153  The original 
Slingbox was created by a pair of keen Giants baseball fans who found it difficult 
to follow their team’s progress through the World Series while they were 
travelling.154  They came up with a product that, when connected to the home video 
source and network router, received the video signal, encoded it into a compressed 
format and transmitted it online to another device on request, enabling users to 
access their home TVs and DVRs from any other Internet-connected screen.155  
Slinging does not involve making copies of works, just retransmitting them 
elsewhere.156  Technical restrictions prevent Slingboxes from placeshifting to more 
than one device at a time, and the use of passwords and encryption further prevent 
shows from being “slung” to the public at large.157  A number of consumer 
products now incorporate such technology, including Dish’s Hopper with Sling 
DVR and TiVo’s Stream and Roamio DVRs.158 
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Dish has incorporated slinging technology in its DVRs in various forms since 
2009.159  The technology was recently challenged as part of Fox’s ongoing 
litigation against Dish’s Hopper DVR technology.160  Dish attracted Fox’s ire in 
2012 after launching a DVR with a feature called PrimeTime Anytime.  Once that 
feature is activated, it automatically records all prime time programming from each 
of the four major broadcast networks and retains it for eight days, effectively 
enabling subscribers to access prime time broadcast content on demand.161  A few 
months later, Dish added a new feature called AutoHop that worked with 
PrimeTime Anytime to skip commercials.162  If AutoHop was available, 
subscribers would be alerted when watching the relevant recording.163  If they 
chose to automatically skip the commercials, they would see just a few seconds 
from the beginning and end of an ad break.164  “Unlike the 30-second skip feature 
available on many DVRs, once a user has enabled AutoHop, the user does not press 
anything to skip through commercials.”165 
The court rejected Fox’s request for a preliminary injunction against Dish’s 
provision of the PrimeTime Anytime and AutoHop features.166  By that point, 
however, Dish had released Hopper with Sling, a “second generation’” version of 
the Hopper that incorporated slinging technology.167  Combined with the “Dish 
Anywhere” software, it enabled users to watch live broadcast television on a 
remote device, watch prerecorded material stored on the DVR or schedule future 
recordings.168  There are a number of key differences between Dish’s Hopper with 
Sling and Cablevision’s RS-DVR.  For one thing, no copies are ever made as part 
of the transmission process.169  For another, the content is transmitted directly from 
the Hopper to the remote device without passing through the service provider’s 
servers.170  A third difference is that the Hopper exists as a physical box in the 
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hands of the subscriber:  the recordings are stored on that box, and the “slung” 
transmissions emanate directly from it.171  Fox filed another motion seeking to shut 
down this second generation technology, arguing, among other things, that Dish’s 
use of slinging technology infringed the right of public performance.172 
The Central District of California denied Fox’s motion for preliminary 
injunctive relief on the ground that Fox had failed to show the likelihood of 
sufficient harm to warrant an injunction, even were it likely to succeed on the 
merits of the case; the court gave no guidance as to whether the public performance 
claim would be likely to succeed.173  On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, armed with the 
Supreme Court’s decision against Aereo that had been handed down just a few days 
before, Fox argued that Dish “engages in virtually identical conduct when it 
streams Fox’s programming to Dish subscribers over the Internet.”174  Fox 
suggested that Dish both engages in the relevant performances and that these were 
“to the public.”175  The Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision, also 
without addressing the merits of the public performance argument, which will have 
to be considered at trial.176  While other DVR providers also incorporate slinging 
technology (including TiVo, in its Roamio Plus and Pro versions), we focus our 
analysis on Dish’s liability for performances emanating from its Hopper with Sling 
technology. 
The Hopper with Sling is a device physically located in the home of each 
subscriber.177  Subscribers lease the box from Dish at a current cost of twelve 
dollars per month, and Dish continues to own the boxes for the lifetime of the 
arrangement.178  While it is possible to buy one of the devices outright, subscribers 
will still be obliged to pay the same monthly device fee:  the only benefit of 
purchasing is to avoid being locked into a minimum contract term.179  The Hopper 
with Sling allows the transmission of copyright-protected content in the form of 
live TV signals as well as material that has previously been recorded onto the 
DVR.180  While essentially the same technology is used to deliver both types of 
performances, it is necessary to separate out those activities in order to apply the 
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principles enunciated by the Supreme Court. 
a.  Who Engages in the Performances of Live TV? 
The Supreme Court instructs us that a provider will be considered to have 
“performed” (rather than merely provided the equipment for others to do so) at 
least where it is sufficiently similar to the CATV companies that Congress 
amended the Act to capture.181  In finding that Aereo was sufficiently similar, the 
Court found it notable that the service Aereo sold was for the near-live broadcast of 
TV, and that Aereo used its own equipment, housed centrally, outside of its users’ 
homes.182 
When it comes to the transmission of live TV, Dish has many similarities to 
Aereo.  Both providers are, at least in part, selling access to near-live broadcast TV, 
and both of them use their own equipment to do so.  The primary difference lies in 
the location of the equipment.  While Aereo’s equipment is housed centrally, 
Dish’s sits in each subscriber’s home.  One further difference is that Dish may not 
provide all of the relevant equipment.  It is unclear whether Dish’s technology 
requires additional equipment such as an external antenna or receiver that must be 
provided by the subscriber, or whether Dish provides all the necessary equipment.  
Either way, however, it may be sufficiently analogous to a CATV provider to be 
taken to have itself engaged in the performances. 
b.  Are Those Performances “to the Public”? 
If those performances are made by Dish, would they be “to the public”?  Dish 
may argue that it is distinguishable from Aereo in that it has paid the compulsory 
satellite retransmission license fee to make the programming available to its users 
in the first place.183  However, it is irrelevant that Dish may have a license for a 
different service.  The correct analysis is to ask whether Dish needs a license for the 
additional service, which it would if the relevant performances fall within the scope 
of the copyright owners’ exclusive rights.  If not, there is no need to obtain a 
license.  If so, then it becomes necessary to ask whether there is a license that 
extends to that conduct.  In the case of Dish, its license to provide the content to the 
users in the first place does not extend to these online retransmissions and thus 
would not avail it here.184 
As was the case in Aereo, Dish’s subscribers would seem to have no prior 
relationship to the works.  No copies are made when the Hopper “slings” content to 
users, and the slinging occurs nearly simultaneously with the transmission of live 
TV.185  Any argument that subscribers have a prior relationship by virtue of their 
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entitlement to access those signals from their home TVs would seem doomed to 
failure:  because the “slung” transmissions are of live TV, the “prior” element must 
by definition be missing.  Additionally, if it is Dish that is engaging in the 
transmission, fair use is unlikely to assist it any more than it did Aereo.  For these 
reasons, if a court found that Dish was the performer, the court would likely also 
find public performance liability. 
The analysis of whether the performance was “public” looks quite different if 
we assume that it is Dish’s subscriber who performs; Dish’s liability, if any, would 
be derivative of its subscriber’s, and the subscriber would be unlikely to be 
performing “to the public.”186  Although the individual subscriber who streams to 
herself may well be paying primarily to watch broadcast TV, and lack any prior 
relationship to the works, she is not making the transmission available to a “large” 
or “substantial” number of people, merely to herself.  Furthermore, if it was the 
user engaging in the transmission, she would have a much stronger fair use case for 
accessing those signals via remote devices.187  Liability would be unlikely. 
c.  Who Engages in the Performances of the TV Timeshifted via a Hopper with 
Sling, and Are The Performances “to the Public”? 
In the case of transmissions of prerecorded, timeshifted TV, the analysis is 
similar to that for the timeshifting services provided by Aereo and Cablevision.  
The one key difference is that the equipment is located at the subscriber’s home 
rather than remotely.  Under the Aereo majority’s reasoning, this factor would 
strengthen the argument that the transmissions are made by the subscriber rather 
than the provider.188  The analysis about whether those transmissions would be “to 
the public” would be the same as set out above. 
d.  Is “Slinging” Unlawful After Aereo? 
Slinging technologies were not at issue in Aereo, and indeed the district court 
judge there noted that the plaintiffs “d[id] not appear to contend . . . that services 
such as Slingbox are unlawful, instead claiming that they are ‘irrelevant’ and that 
Aereo’s service is distinguishable because Slingbox consumers themselves set up 
the Slingbox in their homes.”189  However, the Supreme Court’s reasoning may in 
fact be sufficiently broad to capture these uses—at least where their provider is 
sufficiently analogous to the CATV providers the Act was intended to cover.  
Recall that the cable television services Congress brought within the 1976 Act 
included retransmissions not only of local signals (Aereo’s business model), but 
also of distant signals (akin to Dish).190  Just like Aereo, Dish is selling a service 
for the near-live broadcast of TV, and it is using its own equipment to do so.  The 
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only real difference between the two is that equipment is not housed centrally.  If 
this is sufficient to result in a finding that Dish performs, those performances would 
clearly be “to the public.”  Under the Court’s ruling, however, a different result 
would likely follow from other versions of slinging technology.  For example, it is 
possible for a user to purchase for a one time outright fee a standalone Slingbox 
that plugs into her existing cable box or DVR.191  In that case, the technology 
provider’s role is relatively attenuated:  the user would be the one engaging in the 
transmissions, and, for reasons already canvassed, would not be doing so “to the 
public.”192 
3.  Portable Antennae, or “Tablet TV” 
Yet another variation on the theme is a new technology called “Tablet TV,” 
which is shortly due to launch out of San Francisco.193  Subscribers will purchase a 
device called a “T-Pod”—a digital TV antenna, tuner and DVR about the size of a 
palm—for around $50 to $100.194  Users have to be within 100 feet of the T-Pod to 
stream content, but otherwise the product effectively enables subscribers to 
replicate Aereo’s near-live functionality with their own equipment.195  This time, 
the product is actually being driven by a broadcaster, Granite Broadcasting, which 
claims to reach some six percent of U.S. television households.196 
The product was announced well before the Supreme Court decided Aereo.  In 
the post-Aereo world, however, its legality remains assured.  Since the Tablet TV 
will be both owned by its users and physically located in their premises, its 
developers have a strong case that they are mere equipment providers, and that it is 
the users who engage in any relevant act.  Those users’ access to free-to-air TV via 
their own antennae trigger no exclusive rights under copyright; their at home 
transmissions are not “to the public.”  Thus, there would be no infringement. 
IV.  REPORT CARD:  EVALUATING THE DECISION 
The interpretations of both sides of the Aereo controversy could have made 
technological design determine the existence of public performance liability.  
Aereo’s interpretation of the law would have precluded a finding of public 
performance in many cases where the service structured the transmission so it 
could be received by only a single individual.197  The broadcasters’ interpretation 
 
 191. Sling Store, SLING, http://perma.cc/7P23-BJLU (last visited Oct. 3, 2014). 
 192. See discussion supra Parts II.B.2, II.C.2.b. 
 193. See Benny Evangelista, No Fees, No Wires, Just TV on a Tablet, Startup Promises, SFGATE 
(Aug. 24, 2013), http://perma.cc/CQG8-7EQF. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. 
 196. About, GRANITE BROADCASTING CORP., http://perma.cc/NU5L-DWV3 (last visited Oct. 3, 
2014). 
 197. Regarding the circumstances necessary for successful “Aereoization,” see Giblin & Ginsburg, 
supra note *, at 19–21.  See generally Megan Larkin, The Demise of the Copyright Act in the Digital 
Realm:  Re-Engineering Digital Delivery Models to Circumvent Copyright Liability After Aereo, 37 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 405 (2014) (showing how businesses previously held to be infringing could follow 
GIBLIN & GINSBURG, WE (STILL) NEED TO TALK ABOUT AEREO, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 109 (2015)  
140 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [38:2 
could have resulted in deeming a public performance to have occurred whenever a 
service happened to make transmissions of the same works to multiple members of 
the public.198  Neither interpretation focused sufficiently on the economic (as 
opposed to technological) nature or consequences of the use, and neither 
recognized the potential relevance of the relationship between the recipient and the 
work.  In finding that Aereo’s interpretation prevailed, even the Second Circuit 
itself lamented the way in which its reasoning led to technological design 
determining liability; it admitted:  “Perhaps the application of the Transmit Clause 
should focus less on the technical details of a particular system and more on its 
functionality, but this Court’s decisions . . . held that technical architecture 
matters.”199 
Though the authors of this paper approach copyright law and policy from very 
different perspectives, we unite in the view that it is undesirable for legal outcomes 
to depend so heavily on technical design.  Such laws are vulnerable to “avoision”—
conduct, combining aspects of law “evasion” and “avoidance,” that exploits “the 
differences between a law’s goals and its self-defined limits.”200  In our previous 
work we urged the Supreme Court to develop what it means for a performance to 
be “to the public” in order to enable principled readings of the Transmit Clause 
which focused on the particular use rather than on the technical architecture of the 
delivery service.201  In this section, we debate the extent to which the Court 
succeeded in doing so and the benefits and demerits of its approach. 
The majority’s reasoning succeeds in preventing businesses from “Aereoizing” 
their way out of liability by simply designing services to make separate 
transmissions from unique copies to individual users.202  It also ensures that future 
technology providers will not face public performance liability simply because 
their services happen to make transmissions of the same works to multiple 
members of the public.203  However, the majority missed its mark in developing a 
principled reading of the Transmit Clause.  Under its reasoning, design 
characteristics still matter too much—both to determining whether transmissions 
are “to the public,” and in establishing who performs in the first place. 
A.  VULNERABILITIES IN THE COURT’S DECISION 
In determining whether transmissions are “to the public,” the majority 
repeatedly stressed the size of the potential audience, holding that, if it is not 
“large” or “substantial,” the performance cannot be “public.”204  Under this 
reasoning, services structured to offer content to small audiences could fall outside 
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the scope of the Act—even, perhaps, if the small audiences cumulatively became 
large.  As we noted above, the Copyright Act in fact refers to the size of the 
audience only in the context of determining whether a performance is occurring in 
public, rather than whether it is transmitted to the public.205  It is likely that the 
majority imported that size requirement into the latter analysis to avoid problems of 
over-inclusivity arising from its ruling that the relevant act was the performance of 
the underlying work (rather than the individual transmission).  Limiting the scope 
of the clause to situations where the performance is directed to a “large” number of 
people ensures that reading will not scoop up too many performances that might 
better be seen as “private.”206  Problematically, however, the Court’s emphasis on 
the size of the potential audience risks automatically putting a swathe of 
transmissions outside the scope of copyright owners’ exclusive rights without any 
consideration of whether those uses interfere with the market for their works or 
otherwise cause harm. 
Importing a size requirement into the Transmit Clause misses the essence of the 
statutory distinction between public performances (encompassed within the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights) and non-public performances (to which 
exclusive rights do not extend):207  size is a proxy for economic significance; in 
most cases (at least under prior technologies) a transmission offered to a small 
group of persons, or to members of a family and its social acquaintance, would not 
have significantly intruded on the copyright owner’s markets for publicly 
communicating performances of the work.  But size is not a value of its own, and 
the omission of a size-of-audience criterion from the text of the Transmit Clause 
(unlike the performance “in public” clause) should be taken seriously.  What 
matters is whether the offeree of the transmission is a “member of the public,” not 
how many members of the public are “capable of receiving” the transmission.  The 
omission of a size threshold from the Transmit Clause enables the public 
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performance right to adapt to changing market conditions as the means and 
granularity of transmissions evolve. 
B.  CONSEQUENCES OF THE MAJORITY’S INTERPRETATION OF “TO THE PUBLIC” 
The majority’s definition of “to the public” effectively obliged the Court to rule 
that the “performer” of the act of communication was the service rather than the 
subscriber.  Imagine an Aereo-style service that offered near-live transmissions 
from individual antennae, on demand from specific users, without making any 
copies.  Suppose further that the person deemed to be making the performance was 
the subscriber rather than the service.  If the subscriber was deemed the one who 
engaged in performances from the remote antenna to her own computer, she would 
not be doing so “to the public” under the majority’s reasoning because she would 
not be offering it to a “large” group of people.  There would have been no need 
even to consider whether the use was fair, because there would have been no prima 
facie infringement in the first place.  Such a finding would have opened the 
floodgates to services offering near-live TV with no obligation to remunerate right 
holders for that content, including the cable and satellite companies that currently 
pay billions of dollars a year in retransmission fees.208 
This hypothetical shows that, to avoid cleaving that enormous new loophole into 
the law, the Court had to find that Aereo was the performer.  And to do that, it 
needed to base its analysis on something other than “volition”—the criterion on 
which the dissent relied to contend that Aereo had not “performed,”209 and on 
which Cablevision’s analysis of who “made” the copy rested.210  In plain English, 
volition refers to “the making of a definite choice or decision with regard to a 
course of action; exercise of the will.”211  Showing the defendant’s “volition” had 
not, in fact, historically been an element of a copyright infringement claim.  
Instead, it had long been established that copyright infringement required no 
demonstration of defendant’s intent to infringe.212 
“Volition” as a criterion for determining who commits the copyright-triggering 
act can be traced to the 1995 decision by the District Court for the Northern District 
of California in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom.213  There, the court 
declined to hold an ISP or bulletin board provider directly liable for its facilities’ 
automatic reproduction of a copyrighted work that one of its users had posted.214  
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(The service had not originated the communication of the content at issue.215)  The 
court reasoned that, despite copyright infringement’s strict liability standard, “there 
should still be some element of volition or causation that is lacking where a 
defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.”216  The Fourth 
Circuit subsequently endorsed that distinction in a case involving an ISP whose 
subscribers uploaded infringing photographs to its servers.217 
The Second Circuit in Cablevision significantly extended the ambit of the 
volition criterion from passive communication of third party content to proposing 
content to copy at the user’s behest.  That court held that, “In determining who 
actually ‘makes’ a copy, a significant difference exists between making a request to 
a human employee, who then volitionally operates the copying system to make the 
copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, which automatically obeys 
commands and engages in no volitional conduct.”218  Though noting that 
Cablevision’s discretion over the programming that it was making available for 
recording made its conduct “more proximate” to the creation of the copies than 
merely “operating an ISP,” the Second Circuit concluded that Cablevision’s 
involvement did not suffice to justify a finding that Cablevision was itself a 
“make[r]” of the copies.219  Unlike its predecessors in the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits, the Second Circuit found an absence of volition even where the service 
was the source of the content communicated to the users. 
Whether or to what extent “volition” is in fact a predicate to a finding of 
infringement therefore invites debate.  In any event, the Aereo majority held that 
Aereo was the one that engaged in the performances without any reference to 
volition at all.  The majority carefully cabined its reasoning to cable TV-like 
technologies, and emphasized that it did “not determine whether different kinds of 
providers in different contexts also ‘perform’”; thus, it did not explicitly reject a 
volition standard, either.220  Nonetheless, it is worth addressing the troubling 
consequences that could arise if some concept of willing participation in the 
communication were to be completely rejected in determining who does the legally 
relevant act. 
As the dissent pointed out, volition is a vital tool for preserving the distinction 
between primary and secondary infringement.221  If a user puts a technology to 
infringing use, the provider’s secondary liability will depend on both the existence 
of primary infringement and the extent of its contribution to or involvement in that 
infringement.  The distinction between direct and secondary liability has long 
provided welcome breathing room for new technologies and uses.  If the 
subscriber’s deliberate act is attributed to the passive technology provider instead, 
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that distinction evaporates.  The question of “who does the act” is also vital to 
considerations of fair use.  As described above, U.S. fair use law has historically 
applied very differently to services that engage in uses on their customers’ behalf 
than to customers who do those same acts themselves.222  Thus, if the technology 
provider is found to be the one engaging in the relevant act, the likelihood that its 
conduct will be ruled “fair” diminishes.223 
In bypassing any mention of volition in its finding that Aereo was the performer 
of the relevant acts (and thus itself directly liable for infringement), the majority 
may have implicitly recognized that secondary infringement mechanisms would not 
in that instance sufficiently safeguard right holder interests.  As we explained 
above, the majority’s interpretation of “to the public” effectively obliged it to find 
that Aereo was the one that “performed” the transmissions.  Since the subscriber in 
the Aereo one-transmission-one-recipient scenario was never transmitting to a 
“large” number of people, a ruling that the subscriber was the “performer” would 
have precluded any finding of prima facie primary infringement.  As a result, all 
manner of personalized retransmissions would have fallen outside the scope of the 
Act, and without any direct infringement there can be no basis for holding the 
service provider secondarily liable. 
That said, the absence on Aereo’s facts of a viable secondary infringement claim 
does not in general invalidate or render irrelevant the traditional distinction 
between primary and secondary infringement.  Instead, it highlights the need for 
sensible and principled rules governing primary infringement.  The Supreme Court 
failed to provide such rules in Aereo.  While its solution removed Aereo from the 
near-live television retransmission market, its underinclusive definition of the 
words “to the public” (and particularly its focus on the need for the potential 
audience to comprise a “large” number of people) may blur the distinction between 
primary and secondary infringement, at least in scenarios resembling Aereo’s.224  
Since there can be no direct liability in situations where the performance is directed 
to only a small number of people, the only way to grant relief may be, as occurred 
on Aereo’s facts, to find that the service provider itself engaged in the act.  The 
Court’s focus on the service’s acts also enabled it to forego inquiry into whether or 
not the subscriber’s use was “fair.” 
Our application of Aereo’s principles to other technologies demonstrates that a 
great deal hangs on “who does the act.”225  We are not convinced that this outcome 
is desirable or appropriate.  We live in a world where technologies provide us with 
ever-more sophisticated assistance in our day-to-day lives.  Backup software 
automatically scans our hard drives for new content, and uploads copies to the 
 
 222. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
 223. Some recent case law, however, points toward a conflation of fair uses by end users and 
copying by commercial and noncommercial entities that enable those uses.  See Authors Guild v. 
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that massive book scanning by Google was fair use 
because of the beneficial noninfringing uses that the digitized books enabled Google’s and the 
HathiTrust library consortium’s users to make); Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 954 F.Supp.2d 282 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), appeal docketed, No. 13-4829 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 2013).  
 224. Cf. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 225. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
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cloud for safekeeping.226  TiVos helpfully record shows for us based on programs 
we have previously enjoyed.227  As technology advances, courts’ determination of 
who actually engages in the act of public performance (or of reproduction) will 
require the making of increasingly fine-grained and potentially unhelpful 
distinctions that result in analyses that address only part of the story.  If a court 
finds that the user does the act, her right to do the act is taken into account.  But if 
her act is deemed noninfringing, then no consideration is given to whether the 
service provider’s contribution to the commission of the act should be permitted for 
free.228  If the service provider is the “doer,” then courts assess the legality of its 
participation, but give less consideration to whether the ultimate use ought to be 
allowed.229  (Just because the user may have been entitled to do the act for herself 
does not mean that a for-profit service should be entitled to do the act on her 
behalf.230) 
Given the increasing potential for arbitrary outcomes from the “who does?” 
analysis, it seems to us that “who does?” is the wrong question.  A better approach 
would consider whether, after full reflection on the contributions of each party, the 
use should be permitted for free.  This inquiry usually occurs at the exceptions 
stage of the analysis, where courts apply fair use principles with reference to the 
full range of circumstances, including the extent to which the delivery method 
interferes with paid markets for protected works.231  While the authors of this paper 
sometimes disagree about where the fair use line ought to be drawn in specific 
cases, we do agree that it is undesirable for the infringement analysis to turn on 
potentially arbitrary findings about who did the relevant act. 
The arbitrariness of those distinctions can be demonstrated with reference to the 
factors the majority indicated could make a technology provider the “performer” (at 
least in the absence of volition).  Key considerations derived from Aereo will 
include:  Where the equipment is located, who owns it, and how perfect a substitute 
it provides for live TV (or potentially other licensed markets for works).232  In 
addition to the concerns we raise above, we are perturbed by the possibility that 
future judicial determination of whether technology providers have engaged in the 
legally relevant acts will depend too heavily on the relationship of the design of 
their technologies to their business models.  Our application of Aereo’s principles 
to other technologies shows that these factors may make the difference between 
legality and infringement—even when the ultimate act remains the same.  Because 
so much currently hinges on “who does the act?,” the Court’s decision has the 
capacity to influence significantly the evolution of future dissemination 
technologies.  Online access to remote equipment is cheap and efficient, and can 
 
 226. See, e.g., Automatic Cloud Backup, MOZY, http://perma.cc/AS55-L4AL (last visited Nov. 1, 
2014). 
 227. See How to Use TiVo Suggestions, TIVO, http://perma.cc/6QLW-6LA5 (last visited Nov. 1, 
2014). 
 228. See, e.g., Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C. (Fox III), 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 229. See generally Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498. 
 230. See supra notes 133–136 and accompanying text. 
 231. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 232. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2506–07. 
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result in improved access for individuals who cannot afford to purchase it outright.  
Post-Aereo however, providers have powerful new incentives to design products 
that are owned by consumers and based in their homes—even though 
considerations of location and ownership say nothing about the desirability or harm 
of the underlying use.  The Second Circuit had expressed regret that the statute (in 
its view) placed such importance on technical architecture.233  Under the majority’s 
interpretations, technical architecture matters less—but it still matters far too much. 
Perhaps most problematically, the majority’s reasoning is vulnerable to precisely 
the same kind of technological exploitation that it was designed to redress.  
Imagine, for example, what would happen if, rather than streaming content to users, 
Aereo instead redesigned its service to deliver downloads to subscribers’ cloud 
storage lockers.  In our analysis above we demonstrated that, if Aereo redesigned 
its service to offer only its timeshifting product, its potential liability for infringing 
public performances would apparently depend on whether its service was still 
sufficiently cable-like in the case of those time delayed transmissions to treat Aereo 
as the “performer” of the transmissions.234  The longer the time delay, the less 
cable-like the service, hence the prospects for technological redesign to eliminate 
the chance of public performance liability while facilitating precisely the same end 
result.235  The majority confirmed that there can be no performance in the absence 
of the communication of “contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds.”236  
If Aereo delivered downloads instead of streams, there would be no 
contemporaneous perceptibility and therefore no performance for which it could be 
liable.237  And subsequent playback by the user to herself would not be an 
infringing public performance either, under the majority’s reasoning, because she is 
not offering it to a “large” group of people.238  Thus, future providers could avoid 
direct liability for public performance (and potential secondary liability for their 
users’ transmissions) by making a minor change to their technical design that 
interferes little with the function of its timeshifting service.  Whether Aereo’s 
delivery of the downloads would result in liability for infringement of the 
reproduction and distribution rights would turn on the characterization of “who 
copies?,” an issue central to Cablevision,239 but untouched by the Supreme Court’s 
 
 233. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 234. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 235. Indeed, at the hearing before the Southern District of New York on the scope of the 
preliminary injunction, Aereo’s counsel contended that the injunction should be limited to near-
simultaneous retransmissions, and that were Aereo to retransmit ten minutes after the initial broadcast 
commenced, that time delay would be permissible under the Supreme Court’s opinion.  See Aereo IV 
Hearing Transcript, supra note 119, at 27–28.  
 236. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2509. 
 237. Arguably, Aereo would be communicating a performance of the work “by any device or 
process,” since the recording fixes a performance (the original broadcast), and will generate a 
performance when the end user views or listens to the recording.  But it is difficult to reconcile this 
construction with the requirement that the performance be simultaneously perceptible with its 
communication.  
 238. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2509–10. 
 239. See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 130–34 (2d 
Cir. 2008). 
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decision in Aereo.  Were the service deemed the “maker” of the copies, it likely 
they would be held liable.  Were the user the “copier,” the service could potentially 
bear secondary liability depending on the outcome of the fair use analysis.  
In other cases, however, the public performance right is the only one of possible 
relevance.  For example, in the wake of the Aereo decision, a Wall Street Journal 
article proposed a novel way of reducing cable bills:  sharing a single cable 
subscription between two households by utilizing a Slingbox.240  One household 
would have legitimate access to the cable content via a paid subscription, and sling 
the content to the other, giving access to the content without ever making any 
copies.241  The writer argued this arrangement was legal because “this stream goes 
from one cable connection to just one outside device.”242 
But transmissions even to a small audience can interfere significantly with 
licensed markets.  Think about how the arrangement proposed by the Wall Street 
Journal might spread.  The “sharing economy” is all the rage, connecting those 
who have unused resources with those who seek them.  AirBnB, for example, 
creates a market for households to rent out their spare rooms.243  Uber joins those 
who need a ride with those who have a car.244  Households with cable subscriptions 
might readily reach agreement with friends or relatives to share those, too.  And the 
cable-equipped households could add more functionality by attaching the Slingbox 
to a secondary set-top box, allowing both households to have full access to the 
subscribing household’s content without limiting anyone’s viewing choices.245  
Since they are nonrivalrous in consumption, TV signals could be the ultimate 
contribution to the “sharing economy.”246 
We caution, however, that Aereo should not spawn “sharing economy” 
brokerage services, akin to Air BnB or Uber.  A household that offers unused cable 
service to a friend limits not only the transmission but also the offer to one other 
person.  By contrast, an “Uber for cable TV” service offers the surplus cable 
service to the public in general, even though only one household will in fact receive 
the shared cable transmissions.  Properly understood, Aereo’s definition of “the 
public” refers to the public to whom the transmission is proposed.  If the brokerage 
service is putting the sharing household together with the first-comer who replies to 
an offer made to members of the public at large (or, for that matter, to members of 
a more narrowly defined “public,” such as fans of Homeland), the transmissions are 
“to the public.”247 
 
 240. Geoffrey A. Fowler, Getting Rid of Cable TV:  The Smartest Ways to Cut the Cord, WALL ST. 
J. (July 15, 2014).   
 241. Id. 
 242. Id.  
 243. How to Host, AIRBNB, http://perma.cc/FA93-AMY4?type=image (last visited Dec. 1, 2014). 
 244. About Uber, UBER, http://perma.cc/R6M7-NEFN?type=image (last visited Dec. 1, 2014). 
 245. Using Sling, SLINGBOX, http://perma.cc/JNR2-5B99 (last visited Dec. 1, 2014). 
 246. It may well be that “sharing” a signal in such a fashion constitutes a breach of the cable 
service contract.  However, given the likely difficulties in detecting such infringements, the existence of 
contractual remedies would offer cable companies little comfort. 
 247. In this scenario, the “maker” of the transmissions would be the householder, not the broker 
through whom the householder offers to share the subscription with a member of the public.  But the 
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Of course, the Aereo Court did not confront such scenarios, but the proposed 
arrangement indeed appears to be consistent with the Court’s statements, to the 
extent they explicitly exclude transmissions that the person engaging in the 
performance directs to only a small group or to a single individual.248  Applying 
Aereo, the performances would be engaged in by the household providing and 
hosting the equipment and signal.  But the performances would not be “to the 
public” under the majority’s reasoning, because they would not have been offered 
to a “large or substantial” number of people, even though the cumulative impact on 
right holders were many people to adopt this practice could be severe. 
Aereo’s concept of “the public,” at least as currently articulated, seems 
insufficiently nuanced to deal with situations involving individual performances to 
small audiences that cumulatively interfere with markets for licensed alternatives.  
Moreover, once an avenue of exploitation opens, many will surely follow it; the 
more widespread the activity, the more difficult it may later become to interpret the 
Copyright Act to restrict the practice.  Given the potential significance of the public 
performance right, it is disappointing that the Court’s reasoning may open the door 
to some of the same kind of “avoision” or technological exploitation that it was 
intended to address. 
V.  GIBLIN’S CONCLUSIONS 
The above analysis highlights some significant problems that will arise in 
applying the Supreme Court’s ruling in future cases, despite the majority’s careful 
attempt to cabin its holdings.  Its interpretation of the words “to the public” will 
sometimes be underinclusive (by excluding certain transmissions from the scope of 
the public performance right whenever the potential audience is not “large”) and 
sometimes overinclusive (by sweeping up all transmissions where technological 
design and business model suggest the service provider engages in them, regardless 
of the desirability of the ultimate use).  It perpetuates the game of technological cat-
and-mouse because the rules will apply differently depending on who owns the 
equipment, where it is based, whether performances are streamed or downloaded 
and played back later, and the size of the audience.  That makes it vulnerable to 
precisely the same kind of “avoision” that it was intended to address in the first 
place.  The Court’s reasoning also weakens the distinction between primary and 
secondary infringement in a way that will sometimes have the effect of making 
some vital fair use considerations disappear from the analysis altogether. 
 
broker would likely be secondarily liable for contributing to or inducing infringement.  Other scenarios 
might involve intermediaries whose participation might be deemed too attenuated to warrant secondary 
liability, such as the operator of a Craigslist-type website that featured a general “sharing economy” 
category of listings, not broken down into categories sufficiently specific to suggest knowledge of what 
is being “shared.”   
 248. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2511.  
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A.  AEREO’S PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED 
Every one of these problems could have been avoided had the Court more fully 
developed what it means for a performance to be “to the public.”  As previously 
noted, the majority recognized the relationship between the work and the recipient 
as relevant in determining whether a performance is public within the meaning of 
the Act.249  Thus, if the recipient has a license or fair use privilege to use the work, 
that may affect whether the use falls within the scope of the performance right at 
all.  Developed a little further, that relationship could provide a mechanism for 
distinguishing between public and private performances without reference to either 
the design of the technology or the size of the audience.  Australia’s law illustrates 
how that analysis could work.  In determining whether a communication is “to the 
public,” Australian courts ask whether the recipient of the performance is a member 
of the “copyright owner’s public.” 
This approach originates in a line of U.K. cases that focused on the harm the act 
causes to the author of the work in determining whether a performance was “in 
public.”250  Proceeding on the basis that such harm is the crucial consideration, 
Australian law recognizes “the relevant ‘public’ [a]s the group which the copyright 
owner would otherwise contemplate as its public for the performance of its 
work.”251  Thus, the essence of a performance “to the public” in Australian law is 
that it is occurring in circumstances where the owner is entitled to expect payment 
for the work’s authorized performance.252  This interpretation recognizes that it is 
sometimes possible for a user to engage in a public performance even where she 
transmits a work to herself.253  The size of the audience does not matter, only the 
relationship between the recipient and the copyright owner or the work. 
By focusing squarely on whether the use is something for which the copyright 
owner could reasonably expect a royalty, this interpretation provides a principled 
way of distinguishing between uses that should and should not be permitted.  Such 
distinctions can be made even where the technology, service provider and audience 
are the same, independent of arbitrary considerations such as the size of the 
audience, how the system works, where the equipment is located and who owns the 
equipment.254  Thus, it is able to distinguish between a person slinging her cable 
signal to a tablet computer to watch it in bed instead of on the couch on the one 
hand (something that seems likely to be a fair use), and two households using the 
 
 249. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
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same technology to avoid having to pay for two separate subscriptions on the other 
(which, given the purpose and character of the use, and its potential effect on the 
market, does not).  The former is not a situation where it would be reasonable for 
the copyright owner to expect a royalty, but the latter certainly would be. 
The question of “who performs” becomes much less significant in my proposed 
analysis, because the focus would be on the relationship between the recipient and 
the work.  That relationship remains the same regardless of who actually transmits 
the content.  Since, under my approach, primary infringement can accrue equally 
regardless of who does the act, this conception reduces the potential for very 
different outcomes, which depend on arbitrary factors, such as who owns the 
equipment and where it is based.  Having said that, I would not deprive the 
question of “who performs” of all significance:  under the existing law, it is still 
determinative of who bears that direct liability. 
As previously identified, under Aereo, a finding that the equipment provider 
“performs” would have two main effects.  First, fair use would apply differently 
than if the user were identified as the doer.255  By contrast, my approach would 
significantly ameliorate that consequence, since I would give consideration to 
whether the recipient had a fair use privilege in determining whether the 
communication was “to the public” regardless of who performs it. 
The second consequence of the Aereo analysis is that the traditional distinction 
between primary and secondary infringement would disappear.  I see this as 
troubling, at least in cases where the service provider has not in some way 
exercised its will to bring about the act.  That outcome could be avoided by 
applying some form of “volition” standard.  Where the user is identified as being 
the one who does the legally relevant act, the service provider’s liability could then 
be determined applying existing secondary liability principles assessing the extent 
of its encouragement, contribution or involvement. 
Applying such a reading of the Transmit Clause would avoid all of the problems 
identified above—and not necessarily mean a free pass for Aereo.  Assume that an 
individual Aereo subscriber transmitted works to herself, near-live to the broadcast 
time, and was deemed to be the performer of those transmissions.  Whether or not 
those performances were “public” would come down to whether, in all the 
circumstances, the copyright owner could reasonably expect a royalty for that use.  
If the use amounted to an unremunerable fair use, there could be no such 
expectation, and the transmission would not be “to the public.”  If no exception 
applied, however, that online streaming of a protected work (particularly in 
circumstances where the copyright holder offers that service in exchange for 
royalties) would be precisely the kind of situation where a royalty could be 
expected.  In that case, the recipient would be one of the copyright owner’s public 
and would thus have engaged in a public performance.  The standard would adjust 
with usage:  as technologies and uses evolve, so too would the circumstances in 
which it would be reasonable for the copyright owner to expect a royalty. 
In determining whether the copyright owner could reasonably expect a royalty 
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for the use, full consideration should be given to all relevant circumstances, 
including the extent to which the method of delivery is interfering with the market 
for licensed use.  Crucially, this part of the analysis should not change regardless of 
who is identified as the performer, because the focus is on the relationship between 
the recipient and the work, regardless of who transmits it.  The analytical steps to 
be followed are exactly the same regardless of whether the transmission is directly 
from Aereo’s storage or from the user’s own cloud locker, near-live or time 
delayed.  Whether or not any of those usages would be “fair” has not yet been 
developed in the legal record, but it is by no means clear that the transmissions 
would be accepted as “fair.”  Sony was far from a blanket authorization of any and 
all consumer copying of television broadcasts, and Aereo is readily distinguishable 
on a number of bases including the financial impact its use has on right holders, its 
addition of place-shifting functionality that competes with licensed markets, and 
the general lack of “friction” in the copying process.  If Aereo’s users had no fair 
use right or license to engage in the performances, they would be public.  Aereo’s 
involvement in setting up the transmission system and encouraging its use would 
then result in liability for inducing those infringements, and may also give rise to 
vicarious liability.256  Relying on secondary infringement to obtain redress in cases 
involving suppliers of goods or services can be problematic where the law that 
governs primary infringement is unsatisfactory.  For example, a conception of “the 
public” that relies on transmissions being directed to a “large” number of people 
will fail to fully capture all of the circumstances in which a transmission might be 
public in nature, and there secondary liability cannot be counted on to reliably 
provide redress.  However, where there are principled and effective rules in place 
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regarding primary infringement, as the one proposed here, secondary liability can 
be trusted to provide appropriate safeguards. 
As my coauthor has previously noted, this analysis can be criticized for 
circularity.257  A public performance that amounts to the doing of one of the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights ordinarily gives rise to an entitlement to 
payment.  If the way in which we determine whether such a performance has 
occurred is with reference to whether the right holder is entitled to payment, taking 
account not only the acts that trigger a finding of infringement, but also those that 
excuse it, the analysis may start to look like a snake that is eating its tail.  However, 
the Supreme Court has already indicated comfort with similar circularity via its 
holding that whether or not recipients constitute “the public” often depends on their 
relationship to the underlying work.258  Furthermore, by refocusing the analysis on 
the relationship between the copyright owner and the recipient in determining 
whether the performance is “public” in the first place, that redundancy performs the 
useful function of ensuring the law gives adequate consideration to whether the use 
itself ought to be permitted. 
B.  A MISSED OPPORTUNITY 
The Aereo Court welcomely went some way towards recognizing the 
importance of the relationship between the copyright owner or work and recipient 
of the transmission to the determination of whether a particular performance is 
public.  By developing that concept a little further, the definition of “to the public” 
could provide a principled mechanism for distinguishing between private and 
public transmissions with reference to the use itself, rather than business model or 
technical design.  In its current form, however, the law remains exploitable and 
unsatisfactory. 
Future courts may be tempted to fill in the holes in the majority’s reasoning with 
ever-broader answers to the question of “who performs.”  Where an individual is 
offering a transmission exclusively to herself, but the court nonetheless considers it 
to be the kind of use Congress intended to capture, the only way of bringing it 
within the Act would be to further relax the volition predicate outside the cable TV 
analogy.  That standard has been vehemently criticized by my coauthor, who 
presciently argued in 2008 that it “could herald the development of business 
models designed to elude copyright control over the exploitation of works, 
particularly in a technological environment in which pervasive automation is 
increasingly foreseeable.”259  This is, of course, precisely what Aereo sought to do.  
I agree it is undesirable for laws to be circumventable via clever architectural 
design (rather than by reference to the use). 
Nonetheless, any impulse to disregard “volition” in determining who commits 
the copyright-triggering act should be resisted.  Where users remain intimately 
involved in the copyright-invoking act, the legality of those ultimate end uses needs 
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to remain a relevant consideration, just as the involvement of the service provider 
should be as well.  Imposing direct liability on operators of automated, user-
directed systems with no reference to whether those ultimate uses should be 
permitted is at least as dangerous.  As more of our lives are being lived digitally 
and online, copying and transmission rights are invoked more often, and questions 
about whether we should be permitted to freely engage in those uses grow 
commensurately more important.  Copyright owners’ exclusive rights ought to be 
read in a way that leaves room for those considerations. 
As this analysis has demonstrated, this goal is achievable within the existing 
statutory framework.  By building on the Court’s recognition of the importance of 
the relationship between the user and the work, and further developing what it 
means for a transmission to be “to the public,” it is possible to have a principled 
reading of the Transmit Clause that focuses on the use instead of business model or 
technical design.  Vitally, in a world where it is so cheap and easy for content to be 
streamed online, that reading explains why even transmissions offered to a small 
number of people might be “public.”  It also treats technologies alike, whether local 
or remote, owned or rented, and so avoids biasing the direction of their 
development.  And, perhaps most importantly, it incentivizes technology providers 
to confine their efforts to developing services that assist users to exercise their 
lawful rights instead of continuing to encourage those entrepreneurs to code their 
way outside the scope of the law.  Admittedly, some will always seek to push the 
boundaries of copyright’s exclusive rights and exceptions, and entrepreneurs and 
right holders may have different views about where the frontier between 
infringement and lawful use lies.  We can, however, design laws to minimize the 
opportunities for technological exploitation, and give courts appropriate, principled 
mechanisms for responding to those who step out of bounds. 
VI.  GINSBURG’S CONCLUSIONS 
We have identified two problems the Aereo decision presents to assessing the 
copyright-compatibility of other, future technologies that communicate perfor-
mances or copies of works of authorship.  First, the paramount importance of “who 
performs” (and implicitly, “who copies”).  Second, the determination of “the 
public” to which the work is offered. 
A.  WHO PERFORMS? 
We have suggested that making this question the determinative threshold for 
liability is problematic because the factors that, in the Aereo analysis, make an 
enterprise the “performer” are too susceptible to manipulation, and therefore risk 
elevating technological form over economic substance.  The characterization of 
“who performs” should instead “follow the money.”  A concept of active 
participation in the communication may prove more pertinent, and less technology-
dependent, than the “volition” predicate as employed by the Second Circuit in 
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Cablevision.260  The latter, as we have seen, lends itself to evasion through 
automation.  The “plain English” definition of “volition” may be closer to the 
mark:  “the making of a definite choice or decision with regard to a course of 
action; exercise of the will.”261  It would cover services structured to transmit 
performances of content offered to the public, that is the “course of action.”  If the 
service is proposing the content (including content originally proposed by the 
primary transmission service whose content the defendant service is 
retransmitting), then the (re)transmitter knows what it is offering, even though it 
may not know which particular works the user will select from among the 
offerings.  To the extent these services are instead merely transmitting or allowing 
users to access third party content that the services are not proposing, they might be 
deemed mere equipment providers.262  Moreover, the safe harbor provisions of § 
512(a) and (c) of the Copyright Act absolve of all liability, direct or derivative, for 
both mere conduit service providers and host service providers that remove 
infringing user-posted content upon receipt of a proper notice.263  But to require 
that each transmission manifest specific intent to deliver particular content simply 
invites technological workarounds to limit human intervention to the fullest extent 
possible. 
B.  “TO THE PUBLIC” 
1.  What Does “to the Public” Mean? 
We have queried the coherence of the limiting role of the user’s relationship to 
the work.  How, on the one hand, can there be a public performance if 
transmissions of performances of the same work are offered to a large number of 
persons, regardless of the number of source copies for the transmission, but, on the 
other hand, no public performance when the recipient has some kind of possessory 
relationship to the work?264  The service’s proposal of the content to members of 
the public (in their capacity as members of the public) contributes to the 
determination that its communication is “to the public.”  By contrast, where the 
audience for the transmission from the subscriber’s “own” copy is the subscriber 
herself, Aereo indicates that the transmission is not “to the public” (assuming that 
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copy is not made for the purpose of structuring transmissions to the public, as was 
the case in Aereo).265 
But if the “possessory relationship” renders the communication non-public in 
nature, I would go further:  it should not matter if the service makes the 
transmission from the recipient’s individual “own” copy, or instead from a 
centralized copy, so long as the recipient was already entitled to receive the 
performance.  To require individualized source copies in this context makes the 
determination as technology-dependent as in the Second Circuit’s Aereo and 
Cablevision decisions.  On my view, services like Dropbox should be able to 
centralize repeat-player third-party content that its users store, and not have to 
waste resources duplicating storage space.  The economic impact on the copyright 
owner is the same whether the source copy for the transmission is individualized or 
centralized.  Arguably, once Dropbox centralizes the content, it becomes more 
implicated in the communication of the content, but Dropbox still will not have 
initiated the offer of those works (and therefore under Aereo might not even be the 
entity that “performs” them). 
Whether the transmission is “to the public” should be assessed by reference to 
what kind of service the public is paying for:  streaming of copyrighted content on 
demand on the one hand,266 or access to “my stuff” on the other,267 when “my 
stuff” includes “my” previously-acquired lawfully-made copy or unrestricted right 
of access to the works.  I stress the lawful nature of the relationship between the 
user and the work because the possessory relationship that, according to Aereo, 
justifies labeling the performance as not “to the public” necessarily implies that the 
possession or access be lawful.268  If the content is illegally acquired, it is not 
“mine.”  What makes the possession “mine” may result from a license agreement 
or from a fair or tolerated use, such as format-shifting a hardcopy CD to a digital 
file.  This assessment of the nature of the service is technology-neutral.  What 
matters is what the service does, not how it does it.269 
2.  Does Size of Audience Matter? 
We also have expressed concern that the Aereo Court’s conflation of the two 
different kinds of “public” in the § 101 definition of “to perform publicly” may 
result in excluding transmissions whose potential audiences do not comprise “a 
substantial number of persons,” even when those transmissions in the aggregate 
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may cause a significant economic impact.270  For example, under Aereo, if the 
audience for the subscriber’s “own copy” consists of the subscriber’s family 
members or limited circle of social acquaintance (i.e., not Facebook “friends”), the 
transmission might not be “public.”271  Combined with the sort of slinging to 
friends service posited above,272 one can readily perceive the potential for 
deleterious economic impact. 
My coauthor’s notion of the “copyright owner’s public” could result in a 
determination that in this scenario the works are nonetheless publicly performed.  
But it is not clear under what circumstances, even on a capacious concept of “who 
performs,” the service (as opposed to the subscriber) would be deemed to have 
engaged in the copyright-infringing act.  Moreover, § 512(c) takedowns may not 
offer a solution where access to the content is confined to a closed circle of family 
and social acquaintances, when the copyright owner is unable to discover the 
locations of its works’ availability and the service does not cooperate of its own 
accord in blocking access.273  And if the service is transmitting, but not storing, 
user-communicated content, then § 512(a) confers on the service complete 
immunity from both primary and secondary liability.274  Similarly, given the 
substantial noninfringing uses that multiple-user access to personal storage lockers 
enable in the abstract, the service’s secondary liability is unlikely to be engaged 
unless the copyright owner can show that the service promoted its capacity to 
substitute for paid online access to the stored content. 
The cumulative consequences of end-user communications to a small audience 
thus may yield “public performances” by the end users under a “copyright owner’s 
public” analysis, but as a practical matter those infringements will go unremedied 
unless the service that enables those communications will also, by cooperation or 
by judicial compulsion, prevent them.  Whether this is a good outcome depends on 
whether the law of secondary liability sufficiently distinguishes mere technology 
providers from exploiters of copyrighted works.  The Aereo approach of broadly 
defining the “performer,” and varying the characterization of whether the 
performance is “to the public” based on the recipient’s possessory relationship to 
the content, may—despite the shortcomings we have identified—in many cases 
sufficiently divine the line between equipment and exploitation.  But if the 
Supreme Court persists—notwithstanding the language of the definition of “to 
perform publicly”—in making the size of the audience a criterion for assessing the 
“public” to which a transmission is offered, there remains the risk that 
transmissions to audiences small in instance but large in aggregate may fall outside 
the scope of the copyright law. 
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